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AND TRANSSHIPMENT
Major Field: Industrial Engineering and Management
Abstract: In today's business environment, a competition is no longer about compet-
ing between rms, but between supply chains. Improving supply chain's performance
has become necessary for companies to survive. Supply chain coordination ensures
a maximum performance of a supply chain. This dissertation studies impacts of
an advance-purchase contract and supply chain coordination in two dierent supply
chains.
We rst consider the supply chain with the manufacturer and retailer who can exert
sales eort to stipulate demand. We develop the contract that combines the advance-
purchase contract and the target rebate contract to coordinate the retailer's ordering
and eort decisions. We analytically show that supply chain coordination is achiev-
able, but prot splitting may not be fully exible depending on market conditions.
We second consider the supply chain with the manufacturer and two retailers who
can transship products to satisfy unmet demand as a result of an inventory short-
age. We establish a new mechanism that integrates the advance-purchase contract
to coordinate the supply chain. The coordination mechanism follows in two steps: it
rst aligns the objective of the retailer group with the objective of the supply chain,
and second aligns the individual objective of each individual retailer with the joint
objective of the retailer group. We analytically show that supply chain coordination
and arbitrary prot split is achievable.
The coordinating contracts lead to Pareto improving situations. The numerical anal-
yses show the performance improvement of the supply chain from the inclusion of
the advance-purchase contract. We also conduct the sensitivity analyses to see the
impacts of the contract terms on the retailers' optimal decisions, and the impacts of
market conditions on the contracts. The potential future research directions for both
studies are also discussed.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Consider retailers in two dierent regions who sell a product to end customers within
their own region in a single selling-season. Due to the stochastic nature of customer
demand, the demand and the supply of each retailer may not be perfectly matched,
and therefore there are chances that the retailers might have unsatised demand or
remaining inventory at the end of the selling-season. Companies, such as, Bosch
and Toyota, employ the distributor integration strategy, aka transshipment, to al-
leviate any impact from such circumstances. Toyota dealerships have implemented
a real-time inventory information system to monitor inventory among them. When
a particular model and color of a vehicle desired by a customer is not available, a
dealer searches for that specicity via the inventory system. If that is found, the
\dealer trade" occurs, for which two dealerships, the \nding" and \found" dealer-
ships, swap their vehicles, or the former pays the latter the manufacturer's wholesale
price for obtaining the car. If that is not found, the customer is considered lost.
Another transshipment application on a German paper wholesaler is discussed in [1].
Transshipment is a form of virtual pooling, which is one of the inventory sharing
strategies. It is particularly useful in an industry which is required to maintain a high
service level where inventory cost is expensive, or involves a high-end or necessary
product. Eective transshipment is enabled with good information ow and reliable
transportation links. It mimics the eect of risk pooling, which reduces variability
of aggregated demand and results in a lower safety-stock level or higher customer
service level or both. In general, there are two major types of transshipment: lat-
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eral transshipment and preventive transshipment. Lateral transshipment is employed
as a reactive action where after satisfying own demand, a location with insucient
inventory makes a request for an emergency supply to another location with excess
inventory. In contrast, preventive transshipment re-balances inventory at locations
before demand observation. Apparently, for a single selling-season supply chain, lat-
eral transshipment is more desirable unless forecast information changes after an
inventory decision has been made. The pioneer studies on lateral transshipment in
a single-echelon supply chain are Robinson [2] and Rudi et al. [3], which the latter
focuses on supply chain coordination.
Sales eort can be used as a performance-improvement strategy from both mar-
keting and operation perspectives. For example, a retailer can oer a promotion or a
discount (see, e.g., [4]), expand shelf-space, invest in eective advertising, enhance de-
mand forecasting (see, e.g., [5, 6]), provide better after-sales service or better educate
customers about a product (see, e.g., [7]). These activities have become commonly
used strategies in practice. For instance, retailers such as Wal-Mart and Sprouts mail
out their weekly-sales ads to households, and car dealerships often oer a 0% interest
or a deep discount from MSRP on their new cars. Even though these actions can en-
hance supply chain prot, a proper mechanism is needed to ensure optimal behaviors
of the players in these circumstances.
Supply chain coordination is to make decisions from the supply chain's stand-
point, rather than from the individual company's standpoint. Professor Hau Lee
from Stanford University states, \The battle for market supremacy will not be be-
tween enterprises but between supply chains." If the supply chain wins (loses), every
player in the supply chain wins (loses). Double marginalization causes supply chain
ineciency, which exists when an objective of supply chain's players is not aligned
with the objective of the supply chain. A properly designed supply contract uses pric-
ing and incentive mechanisms to resolve the double marginalization and to achieve
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supply chain coordination. Amongst coordinating contracts, a revenue-sharing (see,
e.g., [8]), a buy-back (see, e.g., [9, 10]), and a rebate (see, e.g., [11, 12] contracts are
the most studied and utilized due to their simplicity and applicability. Practical ap-
plications also appear in industries. For example, a revenue-sharing contract is used
in the video rental industry, a buy-back contract is used in the book or magazine
industry, and a rebate contract is used in the automotive industry.
In contrast, an advance-purchase discount contract, hereafter referred to as an
advance-purchase contract for short, provides a retailer two ordering opportunities
associated with two dierent wholesale prices: an advance (or rst) wholesale price
and a regular (or second) wholesale price. An incentive is oered by pricing an
advance wholesale price lower than a regular wholesale price. It was rst studied by
Cachon [13] and later applied by Berndt and Hurvitz [14] in the healthcare industry.
This dissertation studies impacts of the advance-purchase contract and supply
chain coordination in two dierent supply chains. The rst study considers a supply
chain that includes a manufacturer and a retailer, where the manufacturer oers a
target rebate contract to the retailer who can exert a sales eort, which is costly and
noncontractable. Taylor [11] shows that with only a target rebate contract, supply
chain coordination is not achievable. He then combines a buy-back contract with a
target rebate contract to coordinate the supply chain. He et al. [15] utilize a rebate
contract and a penalty mechanism to coordinate the similar supply chain. However,
there are associated practical drawbacks. First, a buy-back contract creates addi-
tional undesirable processes, which may incur extra costs, such as cost of handling,
administering or transportation. Second, lost sale is dicult to monitor, especially
in today's e-commerce environment. For example, in the retail industry when an
online retailer is out of stock for a particular product, an \Out-of-Stock" notice is
displayed on the web page. In that circumstance, the customer may choose to be no-
ticed via an email when the product becomes available; however, not every customer
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opts into such strategy. To address these problems, we replace a buy-back contract
or a lost-sale penalty with an advance-purchase contract.
The game between the manufacturer and retailer is modeled as a Stackelberg
game, where the manufacturer (the leader) designs and oers a target rebate plus an
advance-purchase contract to the retailer (the follower). The retailer sees the contract
terms and make their ordering and eort decisions. We follow Taylor's approach (see
[11]) to derive a coordinating second wholesale price and a coordinating unit rebate,
then use a rebate target level and a rst wholesale price to attain arbitrary prot
split between the manufacturer and the retailer.
Next, we study the second supply chain with a manufacturer and two independent
retailers with transshipment. In addition to a double marginalization eect created
between the manufacturer and the retailers, transshipment causes another double
marginalization eect between the retailers because the retailer intends to make as
much prot as possible from providing transshipment by setting a high transshipment
price. To coordinate the supply chain, both eects need be resolved. Although
Rudi et al. [3] establish coordinating transshipment prices to eliminate the double
marginalization eect between the retailers, there is still a need to resolve the other
double marginalization eect while sustaining the outcome of Rudi et al. [3]. We
develop the two-stage coordinating approach, in which rst the supply chain prot
is split between the manufacturer and the retailers through an advance-purchase
contract, and then the retailers split their prot through coordinating transshipment
prices.
The game between the manufacturer and retailers is a Stackelberg game, where the
manufacturer (the leader) designs and oers an advance-purchase plus transshipment
contract to the retailers (the follower). The retailers see the contract terms and make
their ordering decisions. We show that the supply chain prot can be expressed as a
linear combination of the manufacturer's and retailers' prots, where the coecients
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are a function of an arbitrary prot split parameter (see [16] for more details). To
accomplish this, we introduce a transshipment premium to motivate the manufacturer
to facilitate transshipment. We then follow Rudi et al. [3] to derive coordinating
transshipment prices, and use them for splitting prot between the two retailers.
The organization of this dissertation study is as follows. The next chapter re-
views existing related literatures. The problem statement, research objectives and
contributions of each study in this dissertation are described in Chapter 3. Chapter 4
presents a study of the supply chain under a target rebate contract with sales eort.
The supply chain with transshipment is studied in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 summarizes
the studies in this dissertation and discusses future research directions.
5
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Self-interest and decentralized decision making do not naturally lead to 100% supply
chain eciency so optimal supply chain performance is not guaranteed when every
party in a supply chain optimizes its own individual performance. To improve the
performance of the global supply chain, supply chain coordination helps align indi-
vidual performance of every player with the global supply chain objective. Thomas
and Grin [17] emphasize the importance of supply chain coordination in the eld
of supply chain management. They review literatures pertaining to operational plan-
ning, which includes the coordination between buyer-vendor, production-distribution,
inventory-distribution, and decision making and planning at the strategic level.
From our perspective, we can categorize supply chain coordination for a multi-
echelon supply chain into two broad categories. One is the vertical coordination,
while the other one is the horizontal coordination. Although both help coordinate
the supply chain, their mechanism and interpretation are dierent. Generally, coordi-
nation across echelons can be eciently achieved via risk sharing approaches through
supply contracts, e.g., a buy-back contract, a revenue sharing contract, an options
contract, an advance-purchase contract, etc. Whereas, coordination within an ech-
elon can be accomplished via risk pooling strategies, e.g., inventory pooling, virtual
pooling, product pooling, transshipment, etc.
In the following, we provide the three relevant streams of the literature review:
(1) coordination via risk sharing, (2) coordination via risk pooling, and (3) a supply
chain with sales eort.
6
2.1 Coordination via Risk Sharing: Supply Contracts
The study of vertical supply chain coordination was motivated by Cachon and Terwi-
esch [18], \Even if every rm in a supply chain chooses actions to maximize its own
expected prot, the total prot earned in the supply chain may be less than the entire
supply chain's maximum prot". Although there always exists a conicting incentive
for every player in the supply chain, there also exists a common objective of every
player in the supply chain, which is each rm tries to maximize its prot. Because
of the conict of incentive, total supply chain performance by locally maximizing is
never guaranteed to achieve the supply chain performance by globally maximizing,
considering the global benet of the supply chain.
Without a supply contract in place, Cachon and Zipkin [19] show that under
the competition, rms are trying to lower its inventories more than they would do
under the cooperation, resulting in less system eciency. Supply contracts are typi-
cally agreed between two or more players across two dierent echelons, which allows
risks to be shared between them, and generally provides a downstream player(s) an
incentive to place a larger order quantity, which helps eliminate the eect of dou-
ble marginalization. Thereby, the total supply chain prot increases, and is able to
achieve the optimal supply chain prot. Cachon [20] summarizes necessary character-
istics for good supply contracts. A variety of supply contracts have been studied by
a number of researchers. Pasternack [9], Taylor [11] and Zhang et al. [21] focus on a
buy-back contract. Cachon and Lariviere [8], Pasternack [22], Wang et al. [23], Hu et
al. [24] and Zhang et al. [21] study a revenue-sharing contract and its application in
airline industry. Taylor [11], Lee et al. [25] and Dahai and Liu [12] examine a rebate
contract.
In this work, we consider a supply chain in a single selling-season similar to Cachon
[13] and Dong and Zhu [26], and study a specic supply contract which allows a
retailer to place two orders: an early order before demand observation, and a late
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order immediately after demand observation.
In the next section, we review the literatures related to the advance-purchase
contract and related applications.
2.1.1 Advance-Purchase Contract
An advance-purchase contract provides two ordering opportunities to a retailer to
place an order to a manufacturer at dierent times. Specically, all the units in the
rst order, which is placed in advance, get a discount from the manufacturer, and all
the units in the second order, which is placed at the beginning of the selling-season,
are charged at a regular wholesale price. There are two dierent types of an advance-
purchase contracts in regard to the manufacturer's production decision. For the
rst type, the manufacturer has two production opportunities, corresponding to two
ordering opportunities of the retailers. So, the manufacturer can start production
after he receives each order from the retailer. Whereas the second type gives the
manufacturer only one production opportunity, which occurs in advance of the selling-
season to satisfy both rst and second orders of the retailer due to either a long lead-
time or limited production capacity. This way, the manufacturer has to speculate on
the second order of the retailer and build his inventory to satisfy that.
The studies of an advance-purchase contract have been limited due to the com-
plexity of the model. In the following, we present those that are relevant to our
work. Cachon [13] studies inventory management and production management un-
der a newsvendor setting by applying a push-pull strategy and an advance-purchase
contract. He shows that the advance-purchase contract could lead to global supply
chain eciency, and introduces the Pareto contract, which sometimes requires arbi-
trary and frequent changes of wholesale prices. Later on, Dong and Zhu [26] state
that in reality it is impossible for a rm to keep drastically changing wholesale prices
because the prices of negotiations and renegotiations involve a lot of sensitive issues
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among rms. They, therefore, study multiple pricing scenarios of wholesale prices to
determine which scenario gives the most complete set of a Pareto improvement.
Ozer andWei [27] study an advance-purchase contract in the capacity commitment
problem when the demand information is asymmetric, under which an upstream rm
may not trust provided information of a downstream rm. The authors show the
existence of the optimal order quantity for the rst ordering opportunity of a retailer,
production quantity of a manufacturer, and optimal prices. In addition, channel
coordination can be achieved via a combined mechanism of an advance-purchase
contract and a payback agreement.
Cho and Tang [28] analyze the two procurement opportunities in a supply chain
with a manufacturer and a retailer under uncertain production yield in vaccine in-
dustry. For an practical application in healthcare industry, Berndt and Hurvitz [14]
study a problem in vaccine production under an advance-purchase agreement.
Although the literatures have studied advance-purchase contracts from both the-
oretical and practical standpoints, they have never utilized an advance-purchase con-
tract as a mechanism to coordinate the supply chains that we consider in this disser-
tation. Further, our advance-purchase contract is dierent from those. We relax an
assumption of a long production lead-time to provide a manufacturer a capability to
satisfy a second order of a retailer without having to produce in advance.
2.2 Coordination via Risk Pooling: Transshipment
Typically, transshipment can be categorized into two dierent transshipment policies,
namely preventive transshipment and lateral transshipment.
Preventive Transshipment is the transshipment that happens between two con-
secutive subperiods when the demand information is partially observed. Rong [29]
studies preventive transshipment problems by developing a model for a decentral-
ized supply chain, which consists of two independent retailers who submit their order
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quantity to a supplier before the actual demand is observed. The author shows that
there exists a Nash equilibrium for an order quantity of both retailers, and the transfer
payments alone cannot coordinate the supply chain.
Another advantage of preventive transshipment is it allows rms to re-balance
their inventory between two consecutive time periods. Gullu et al. [30] study the
multi-period framework, which comprises of a single supplier and two independent
retailers with supplier's and retailers' lead-times to determine their optimal individual
order-up-to levels in a periodic review system. Before products are shipped, the
retailers are allowed to transfer stocks at the supplier to improve expected costs. The
authors derive the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium of the retailers' order-up-to
levels, which lead to close-to-optimal performance.
Lateral transshipment is a special case of preventive transshipment where trans-
shipment occurs at the end of time period when the demand information is fully
known. It is typically employed as an emergency supply to \immediately" fulll un-
met demand as a result of an inventory shortage. Reyes [31] uses Game Theory to
solve a small transshipment problem in a fully centralized supply chain under none
cooperative, partially cooperative and fully cooperative environments.
For a single-echelon, centralized supply chain, Axsater [32] evaluates and derives
the decision rule for lateral transshipment in a single-echelon, centralized inventory
system, consisting of multiple warehouses facing Poisson demand. The instantaneous
transshipment is allowed between the warehouses with transshipment cost. The au-
thor derives decision rule, analogous to a savings algorithm, and use it as a heuristic
approach, which guarantees cost savings and performs considerably well, especially
in complex supply chains. Yang and Qin [33] develop a model for one manufacturing
company, consisting of two capacitated plants, which are located in two dierent re-
gions, where the demand in each of the regions is stochastic, and can be satised by a
remote plant via \Virtual Lateral Transshipment". The authors show the modied-
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base-stock property is the optimal production policy, and the demand-by-demand
property as the optimal transshipment policy.
For a single-echelon, decentralized supply chain, Zhao et al. [34] study the multi-
period inventory sharing and rationing game in a network with two independent
retailers, each facing two demand classes: (1) retailer's own customers with high
priority, and (2) the other retailer's customers who request inventory sharing with low
priority. Each retailer determines the base-stock level and the rationing level. The
authors derive the Nash equilibrium, and show (1) the inventory sharing games are
supermodular under particular conditions, and therefore there exists a pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium, (2) there exists a dominant strategy equilibrium for the retailers'
rationing level in the inventory rationing game when the base-stock level of both
retailers are xed, and (3) the inventory sharing and inventory rationing game is not
supermodular over the entire strategy space, but remains supermodular over most of
the entire strategy space and hence the Nash equilibrium exists.
Rudi et al. [3] establish coordinating transshipment for a supply chain with two
independent retailers facing stochastic demand. Hu et al. [35] extend Rudi et al. [3] to
derive the necessary and sucient conditions for the existence of coordinating linear
transfer prices under the lateral transshipment policy in a supply chain with two
production locations, facing stochastic demand and uncertain production capacity.
They found the coordinating linear transshipment prices only exist for symmetric
facilities, which complements the results of Rudi et al. [3], which has no production
capacity.
For the multiple-echelon, decentralized supply chain, Ozen et al. [36] analyze
the problem in a supply chain with a warehouse and multiple retailers facing the
stochastic demand. A retailer is allowed to transship his/her excess inventory to
another. The authors study two allocation games: Forced Allocation and Relaxed
Allocation games, where a warehouse is a cross-dock facility and a DC, respectively.
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The authors demonstrate that in both games, there always exists an equilibrium at
which an optimal allocation and order quantity of a retailer maximizes total expected
prot of the retailers.
Anupindi et al. [37] study the inventory ordering and allocation decisions in a
decentralized distribution system, which consists of warehouses and retailers who face
stochastic demand. The retailers secure inventories prior to the demand observation,
and fulll their demand after the demand observation. Subsequently, if there are an
excess inventory and unmet demand in the system, an owner of that inventory may
share his/her inventory to satisfy the unmet demand to gain residual prot through
an inventory exchange. Using the two-step solution approach by which in the rst
step the retailers agree on the allocation of the residuals, and in the second step they
individually make the decision on their inventory level, the authors establish the core
allocation in the residuals allocation game, and the conditions for the existence of the
pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the inventory game.
Sosic [38] extends Anupindi et al. [37] to consider two dierent types of the
retailers: myopic and farsighted retailers, who receive products from a supplier. The
retailers decide whether or not to participate in the transshipment game. The model
has two stages in which the ordering decision to the supplier, and the transshipment
decision take place in the rst and second stages, respectively. A myopic retailer
views only an immediate payo, whereas a farsighted retailer considers the reaction
of other retailers. The author shows that without an extra mechanism the grand
coalition for myopic retailers is not stable, and is stable for the farsighted symmetric
retailers. Also, the author provides the condition, under which the grand coalition
for asymmetric retailers is farsightedly stable.
There are more existing studies of transshipment, which can be further categorized
based on characteristics of a supply chain. For centralized supply chains, Herer et
al. [39] and Hu et al. [40] study single-period, single-echelon supply chains, Chen et
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al. [41] and Rosales et al. [42] consider single-period, multi-echelon supply chains,
Robinson [2], Hu et al. [43] and van Wijk et al. [44] focus on multi-period, single-
echelon supply chains, and Ozdemir et al. [45], Paterson et al. [46], Yang et al. [47],
Ozdemir et al. [48] and Gong and Yucesan [49] analyze multi-period, multi-echelon
supply chains.
For decentralized supply chains, Huang and Sosic [50] study a single-period, single-
echelon supply chain, Wee and Dada [51] focus on a single-period, multi-echelon
supply chain, Huang and Sosic [52], Granot and Sosic [53] and Van der Heide and
Roodbergen [54] analyze multi-period, single-echelon supply chains, and Comez et al.
[55] and Satr et al. [56] consider multi-period, multi-echelon supply chains.
There have been a few studies of supply chain coordination with transshipment.
In a single-echelon supply chain, Rudi et al. [3] construct coordinating transshipment
prices for two independent retailers. Hezarkhani and Kubiak [57] study the coordi-
nation of a single-echelon supply chain with two companies and develop an \implicit
pricing mechanism" to determine transshipment prices as a function of the production
quantity of the two companies. The authors show that given an optimal production
quantity, there could be multiple values for transshipment prices that coordinate the
supply chain, and the set of such transshipment prices is never empty.
In a multi-echelon supply chain, Dong et al. [58] propose the \transshipment"
contract for a decentralized supply chain with a soft drink manufacturer and two
bottlers: a national and regional bottlers. The optimal order quantity of the regional
bottler is exogenously given, equivalent to that of a newsvendor. The authors con-
sider one-way transshipment from the national bottler to the regional bottler. The
national bottler oers the regional bottler the transshipment contract, which con-
sists of the total payment including prot without transshipment and xed bonus for
transshipment, and inventory sharing ratios for transshipment. The manufacturer
then oers an \incentive" contract to the national bottler in both ex-ante and ex-
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post perspectives. The authors show that the optimal order quantity is decreasing
in transshipment cost, and when the transshipment cost is high, the transshipment
opportunity tends to be limited. In addition, there exists a situation, under which
transshipment is not a worthwhile collaboration option. Although the authors suc-
cessfully coordinate their supply chain, their transshipment mechanism is limited. In
addition, unlike our study, the authors do not use a pricing mechanism to coordinate
a supply chain.
Li et al. [59] study supply chain coordination with transshipment in a single-
supplier, multiple-symmetric-retailers supply chain in two time periods, where both
demand and supply opportunities exist in both periods. At the beginning of the
second period, the retailers can request for transshipment, buy more inventory from
the supplier, and/or sell inventory back to the supplier to adjust their inventories. The
authors identify two misalignments: horizontal incentive conict, which is caused by
the dierence in marginal values of inventory, and (vertical) double marginalization,
which is caused by the dierence in prot margins. The contract uses a lump sum
to guarantee full participation of the retailers, and the transshipment and buy-back
prices are dependent on the system on-hand beginning inventory in the second period.
The authors assume a retailer is not allowed to keep inventory at the end of the
rst period. Hence, this model can be decomposed into two newsvendor problems,
where in each time period each individual retailer order quantity is at the newsvendor
critical fractile. The coordination mechanism in the rst period is purely a wholesale
price contract. Whereas, the coordination mechanism in the second period is more
interesting, by which retailers with existing inventory becomes suppliers, providing
transshipment to retailers who need more inventory to begin with in the second time
period. Although the coordination is achieved in this work, the supply chain setting
is drastically dierent from ours. Because the model can be decomposed into two
newsvendor problems, the existence and impacts of transshipment are signicantly
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reduced.
Even though a lot of research has studied transshipment problems, and a few of
them have successfully coordinated a supply chain, supply chain coordination in a
supply chain studied in this dissertation has never been achieved.
2.3 Supply Chain with Sales Eort
Research on sales eort has appeared in marketing and management science liter-
atures in many dierent appearances. For example, the manufacturer can improve
product quality or extend a shelf-life of a product (see, e.g., [60, 61, 62]). Whereas,
the retailer can oer a promotion or discount (see, e.g., [4]), expand shelf-space, invest
in eective advertising, enhance demand forecasting (see, e.g., [5, 6]), provide better
after-sale service or better educate customers about a product (see, e.g., [7]).
Taylor [11] studies a supply chain with a supplier and a retailer who can exert a
sales eort to multiplicatively stipulate the demand. The author shows that supply
chain coordination is not achievable under a target rebate-only contract, and then es-
tablishes a coordinating contract by utilizing a target rebate contract and a buy-back
contract. For the same supply chain setting, Krishnan et al. [4] study a promotional
eort, which can be exerted after observing demand, and the sales eort cost is both
eort and observed demand dependent. They show that a buy-back-only contract
cannot coordinate the supply chain, hence proposing three coordinating contracts:
an eort sharing contract, a markdown allowance contract and a constrained buy-
buy contract. In addition, He et al. [15] consider the similar supply chain, where
a demand distribution is conditional on eort and a retail price. The manufacturer
species contract terms, and the retailer makes a decision on order quantity, an eort
level and a retail price. The authors study a revenue-sharing contract, a buy-back
contract, and a sales rebate and penalty (SRP) contract, and show that only an
integration of a buy-back contract, and a SRP contract can coordinate the supply
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chain.
A supply chain with sales eort also appears in dierent applications. Ferguson et
al. [7] study a false failure return problem in a supply chain with a manufacturer and
a retailer. To coordinate the supply chain, the authors use a target rebate contract,
under which the retailer receives a rebate for every unit below the return target level,
to encourage the retailer to exert more eort to reduce the number of the false failure
return. Dahai and Liu [12] analyze the eect of free riding in the supply chain with a
manufacturer, an online retailer, and a traditional retailer who exerts sales eort. The
authors establish a coordinating contract, which allows the manufacturer to oer a
selective rebate contract when the traditional retailer guarantees price match. Taylor
and Xiao [5] study the eectiveness of a rebate contract and a buy-back contract in
a supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer who can exert forecasting eort
with a costly cost of exertion. They show that the rebate contract is more eective
in encouraging forecasting eort than the return contract. However, when demand
is dependent of sales eort or a retail price, the return is much more eective. Shin
and Tunca [6] study supply chain coordination of retailers with demand forecast
investments, and analyze the impacts of supply contracts on forecast investments in
both observable and unobservable cases.
Mukhopadhyay et al. [63] study a supply chain with mixed channels in a sym-
metric and asymmetric information cases, where customer demand is price and eort
dependent. For multiple time periods, Chu and Desai [62] study the supply chain,
in which both the manufacturer and retailer can exert eorts to induce customer de-
mand. Heese and Swaminathan [64] study the inventory and sales eort problem with
unobservable lost sales in multiple time periods using Bayesian process to update the
future demand.
For deterministic demand Ma et al. [65] investigate a supply chain, where a
manufacturer can invest in a quality improvement, and a retailer can exert a marketing
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eort to amplify customer demand. To coordinate a supply chain, the authors use
a two-part tari contract, and allow investment costs of both eorts to be shared.
Li and Liu [66] study supply chain coordination for a supply chain with a supplier
and a retailer facing deterministic, price-eort-dependent demand, and show that a
two-part tari contract can achieve supply chain coordination.
In marketing, Lariviere and Padmanabhan [60] study the problem of slotting al-
lowance in new product introduction by allowing a retailer to exert merchandising
eort and decide a retail price to inuence customer demand. Desiraju [67] examines
the relative value of the uniform and the brand-by-brand methods of setting slotting
fees and determines the preferred method of setting slotting allowances.
Even if supply chain coordination in a supply chain with sales eort has been
extensively studied, existing coordination mechanisms are evolved from a buy-back
contract or lost-sale penalty or a combination of both. These two mechanisms have
the practical disadvantages (previously discussed in Chapter 1); thus, there is a need
to develop a dierent coordinating mechanism.
2.4 Summary of the Literature Review
Taylor [11], Krishnan et al. [4] and He et al. [15] serve as a motivation and foun-
dation of our work in Chapter 4. The reviews of them can be found in Section 2.3.
As opposed to a buy-back contract or lost sale penalty, an advance-purchase contract
provides practical advantages. For example, some products when returned may re-
quire lengthly and/or costly processes or become worthless, and therefore executing
a return may not be worthwhile and desirable by both players. In addition, a lost
sale is dicult to detect, especially with today's advanced e-commerce technology,
where a product may be out of stock, and a lost sale is never reported. To make both
schemes work seamlessly, the supply chain may result in overinvesting; thus, reducing
supply chain eciency.
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We summarize the most relevant literatures to the study in Chapter 4 in Table
2.1.
Table 2.1: Summary of Relevant Literatures to the study in Chapter 4
Papers Topics
Rebate Target Rebate Buy-Back Penalty Adv.-Pur.
Contract Contract Contract Mechanism Contract
Taylor [11] X X X
Krishnan et al. [4] X
He et al. [15] X X X
This dissertation X X
Although these papers successfully establish coordinating contracts in a supply
chain with sales eort, our coordinating contract is dierent from those by utilizing
an advance-purchase contract in conjunction with a target rebate contract.
In addition, Rudi et al. [3], Dong and Rudi [68], Zhao and Atkins [69] and Shao
et al. [70] serve as a motivation and foundation of our work in Chapter 5. Dong
and Rudi [68] study the supply chain with a manufacturer and n retailers in a single
time period. The authors analyze the impacts of transshipment from both manufac-
turer's and retailers' perspectives when a wholesale price is exogenously given and
endogenously determined by the manufacturer. For the exogenous wholesale price,
the retailers always benet from employing transshipment through the eect of risk
pooling. For the endogenous wholesale price, the authors show that the retailers are
much less sensitive to the wholesale price and the number of participating retailers.
Hence, the manufacturer benets from setting the higher wholesale price, although
this makes the retailers worse o. Zhang [71] generalizes Dong and Rudi [68] to gen-
eral demand distributions, and further examines their key results by demonstrating
that the transshipment problem is equivalent to a newsvendor problem with adjusted
demand. Then, the impact of transshipment can be examined by analyzing the re-
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lationship between the adjusted demand and the demand of a newsvendor without
transshipment. The author summarizes that while keeping the mean of demand con-
stant, transshipment reduces the demand variability, resulting in the retailers' optimal
order quantity being closer to the demand mean.
Zhao and Atkins [69] study the substitution game and transshipment game in a
supply chain with two retailers, who face stochastic demand, and compete in their re-
tail prices to inuence the demand. The retailers make a decision on their retial price
and order quantity. When customers are not able to nd the product they need at a
particular retailer, they either switch to another retailer who carries a substitutable
product (in the substitution game), or wait at the same retailer until transshipment
from the other retailer arrives (in the transshipment game). The authors show that
under the transshipment game, the retail price and safety stock increase in the trans-
shipment price. Compared to a substitution game, a transshipment game is more
benecial when transshipment is expensive and a competition level is low. Also, if a
transshipment price is endogenously set by the retailers, there is an optimal trans-
shipment price that maximizes the retailer's prot, not the supply chain's prot.
Shao et al. [70] examine transshipment incentives in a supply chain with a man-
ufacturer, and independent retailers or a chain store, i.e., centralized retailers. The
authors nd that the retailer's order quantity under transshipment is increasing in the
transshipment price. In addition, when the manufacturer controls the transshipment
prices, he/she always sets them as high as possible, and thus the manufacturer's prot
increases, and the retailers' prot can be lower with transshipment. When retailers
jointly make transshipment price decision, the retailers benets from transshipment,
and the manufacturer can be harmful. Additionally, the results and ndings hold in
a case of two asymmetric retailers.
We summarize the most relevant literatures to the study in Chapter 5 in Table
2.2.
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Table 2.2: Summary of Relevant Literatures to the study in Chapter 5
Papers Topics
Advance-Purchase Transshipment Transshipment
Contract Mechanism Coordination1
Rudi et al. [3] X X
Cachon [13] X
Dong and Rudi [68] X
Dong and Zhu [26] X
Zhao and Atkins [69] X
Shao et al. [70] X
This dissertation X X X
Although there have been a number of studies on transshipment problems, none of
them has developed a coordinating contract that achieves supply chain coordination
in a single-period, multi-echelon supply chain. To the best of our knowledge, this
dissertation is the rst study, successfully developing a coordinating contract for such
a supply chain.
1The coordination is established in a supply chain setting dierent from this work.
20
CHAPTER 3
PROBLEM STATEMENT, RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND
CONTRIBUTIONS
This dissertation studies impacts of an advance-purchase contract and supply chain
coordination in a supply chain with sales eort (Chapter 4), and in a supply chain
with transshipment (Chapter 5). In the following, we describe the research objectives
and contributions, specic to each study.
3.1 Supply Chain with Sales Eort
3.1.1 Problem Statement
There are two major research problems in this study. The rst is to study the advance-
purchase contract on the supply chain with sales eort. With today's advanced
manufacturing technology, expediting production or acquiring on-demand capacity
to fulll an \emergency" order is very ecient and eective. Our advance-purchase
contract takes advantage of that by allowing the manufacturer to satisfy the retailer's
second order with a negligible lead-time. In addition, an advance-purchase contract
allows the manufacturer to observe the demand partially in advance, thus providing
better understanding of the demand and an adequate amount of time for production.
Therefore, it is worthwhile to consider this contract when developing a mechanism to
coordinate the supply chain.
Literature focuses on dierent mechanisms to coordinate retailer's decisions in
this supply chain. A number of existing coordinating mechanisms utilize a buy-back
contract or a penalty mechanism. However, there are associated practical drawbacks.
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Thus, the second research problem is to replace a buy-back contract or lost-sale
penalty with the advance-purchase contract, and then combine that with a target
rebate contract to coordinate the supply chain.
3.1.2 Research Objectives
Taylor [11] shows that the target rebate contract alone cannot coordinate the supply
chain with sales eort, but a target rebate contract and a buy-back contract combined
can. In practice, neither the manufacturer nor the retailer would want to spend an
extra eort on additional activities for completing a return process. Such activities
include, but are not limited to, administering, handling, transporting, and recycling
unsold products. In this research, we address this issue by establishing a new contrac-
tual mechanism, which replaces a buy-back contract in [11] with an advance-purchase
contract. In the following, we describe the objectives of this research study.
Objective 1: Examine the interactions between a target rebate contract and an
advance-purchase contract.
Under a target rebate contract and an advance-purchase contract, there are two
opposite pulling directions on retailer's optimal order quantity. The target rebate
contract increases the retailer's optimal order size, whereas the advance-purchase
contract lowers the optimal order quantity of the supply chain. Hence, it is unclear
how these two contracts interact via the setting of their contract terms.
Objective 2: Determine whether or not the integration of a target rebate contract
and an advance-purchase contract can achieve supply chain coordination with
arbitrary prot split.
By combining the advance-purchase contract with the target rebate contract, we an-
alytically and numerically demonstrate that supply chain coordination with arbitrary
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prot split is achievable. This is necessary for a contract to result in a Pareto im-
provement. A Pareto improvement is the scenario in which no player is worse o, and
one player is strictly better o.
Objective 3: Quantity the improvements and compare the performance the pro-
posed contract to that in a decentralized supply chain and a newsvendor supply
chain.
To quantify the improvements, we would like to both analytically and numerically
compare the performance of our proposed contract to that of the target rebate-only
contract, and that of no contract. Besides, we also would like to analytically and nu-
merically compare the values of the decision variables, i.e., the retailer's optimal order
quantities and optimal eort level, and the optimal prots under dierent scenarios.
3.1.3 Contributions
Although a lot of research focuses on a problem in a supply chain with sales eort
and successfully establishes a coordinating contract, they utilize a buy-back contract
or lost-sale penalty, which associates with practical drawbacks as described earlier.
In contrast, this study utilizes a target rebate contract and an advance-purchase
contract to coordinate the order quantity and sales eort. Not only does this research
contribute to the existing literature, but also it provides managerial insights on how
to adopt these two contracts to improve supply chain's performance. The followings
are the unique characteristics of our model framework studied in this research.
1. None of the previous studies on a supply chain with sales eort allows a retailer
to place an order at a manufacturer twice. This work incorporates this initiative
by allowing the retailer to place the second order to satisfy unmet demand as a
result of an inventory shortage.
2. This study provides the coordinating mechanism that allows arbitrary prot
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split via the combination of the target rebate contract and the advance-purchase
contract.
3. Managerial insights will help explain practical inuences and impacts of the
contract terms, and strategic behaviors of the players in this setting.
3.2 Supply Chain with Transshipment
3.2.1 Problem Statement
Transshipment is widely used in industries in which great customer satisfaction is re-
quired. In the retail industry, \lateral" transshipment allows two retailers to transship
or resell products between them for an \emergency" supply. This allows the retailers
to improve customer satisfaction and/or to lower safety-stock quantity. Transship-
ment has two opposite impacts on retailers' optimal inventory. On one hand, it lowers
the optimal inventory because it additionally provides a retailer a late option to sat-
isfy demand. On the other hand, it increases the optimal inventory as a retailer
sees an opportunity in a resale. Of course, these impacts are inuenced by who has
control on the transshipment price. Literature shows when the wholesale price is en-
dogenously determined by a manufacturer, he can be harmful if retailers have control
on the transshipment price. In contrast, a manufacturer benets from transshipment,
but a retailer is harmful by transshipment when the manufacturer has control on the
transshipment price. The outcomes are unclear. Thus, there is a need for a remedy,
which addresses this ambiguity and results in a Pareto improvement.
In addition, for the same reason mentioned in the problem statement of the rst
study, it is worthwhile to adopt the advance-purchase contract to coordinate this
supply chain. Thus, the research problem of this study is to develop a coordinating
mechanism that embeds the advance-purchase contract into the framework of the
supply chain with transshipment, and results in a Pareto improvement.
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3.2.2 Research Objectives
It has been shown that the transshipment mechanism alone does not coordinate the
supply chain. In addition, their does not exist a contractual mechanism that coordi-
nates the supply chain with transshipment. This research incorporates an advance-
purchase contract to achieve supply chain coordination. Specically, we would like to
investigate how the manufacturer optimally makes pricing decisions on the transship-
ment prices and the wholesale prices. In the following, we elaborate the objectives to
be accomplished in this research study.
Objective 1: Dene the interactions between transshipment and an advance-purchase
contract.
There are two misalignments in a supply chain with transshipment. One is the hor-
izontal misalignment, where a retailer makes prot from selling products to another
retailer through transshipment. The other is the vertical misalignment, where a
manufacturer gains prot from satisfying retailers' orders. The advance-purchase
contract helps re-align a vertical incentive, thus alleviating the impacts of the vertical
misalignment, but does not help on the horizontal misalignment. When embedded
with transshipment, how would such a contract help re-align both the vertical and
the horizontal incentives, and what are the associated impacts?
Objective 2: Determine whether or not an advance-purchase contract and trans-
shipment can achieve supply chain coordination with arbitrary prot split.
With these two individual mechanisms combined, we analytically and numerically
show that supply chain coordination with arbitrary prot split is attainable. This is
necessary for a contract to result in a Pareto improvement.
Objective 3: Quantity the improvements and compare the performance the pro-
posed contract to that in a decentralized supply chain and a newsvendor supply
chain.
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To quantify the improvements, we would like to both analytically and numerically
compare the performance of our proposed contract to that of the transshipment-only
agreement, and that of no contract. Besides, we also would like to analytically and
numerically compare the retailer's optimal order quantities and the optimal prots
under dierent scenarios.
3.2.3 Contributions
To achieve the objectives above, we develop the framework that represents the trans-
shipment game in the multi-echelon supply chain, and utilize Game Theory to formu-
late the model and analyze the game. This research study provides contributions to
the existing domain knowledge from both theoretical and practical standpoints. The
followings are the unique characteristics of our model framework in this research.
1. Because a retailer would charge as high as possible for providing transshipment
if the retailer has control on the transshipment price, this research establishes
a new contract, which allows the manufacturer to set a priori and include the
transshipment prices as part of the contract.
2. None of the previous studies allows retailers to have the second order placed to
a manufacturer when allowing transshipment. This work supports that idea by
having two wholesale prices, the lower one for the rst order and the higher one
for the second order.
3. Besides setting the transshipment prices, the manufacturer also species the
contract terms in the advance-purchase contract, i.e., the wholesale prices, as
well as the transshipment premium and the prot split parameter.
4. Insights gained from this study will help explain realistic strategic behaviors of
players within the newsvendor setting and transshipment.
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CHAPTER 4
Order Quantity and Sales Eort Coordination with Advance-Purchase
and Target Rebate Contract
In this chapter, we study a supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer who
faces a stochastic, eort-dependent demand for a single product in a single selling
season. We design a contract with a target rebate and advance-purchase agreement
to coordinate both ordering and eort decisions. The contract oers the retailer two
ordering opportunities in conjunction with a target rebate to encourage the retailer to
place a larger rst order and exert more sales eort. With two ordering opportunities,
the retailer places her rst order to obtain her inventory, and after the demand is
observed, places her second order to fulll the unmet demand.
4.1 Model Formulation
4.1.1 Notations
The sequence of events is as follows. In Stage 1, the manufacturer determines the
advance-purchase and target rebate contract parameters. In Stage 2, the retailer
decides on her sales eort level e, and places her rst order to the manufacturer at a
wholesale price w1. Subsequently, the manufacturer produces products with marginal
cost c1. In Stage 3, the retailer receives her inventory, and then observes and fullls
her demand at a retail price r. Also, the manufacturer provides a rebate u for every
unit the retailer sells above the target level T from her inventory. In Stage 4, if
there is unmet demand, the retailer places her second order to the manufacturer at a
wholesale price w2. Subsequently, the manufacturer immediately produces products
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with marginal cost c2 to satisfy the retailer's order. Then the retailer receives her
order and satises her remaining demand at a retail price r.
First Stage: MFG designs and offers the advance-
purchase and target rebate contract to 
RET.
Second Stage: RET exerts effort and places first order.
MFG starts production.
Third Stage: MFG distributes product.
RET satisfies customer demand.
MFG provides a rebate to RET.
Fourth Stage: RET places second order.
MFG produces and distributes products.
RET satisfies customer demand.
MFG RET
MFG RET MFG RET
uY rX
XQ
rZ
Z
Z
MFG RET
w1Q
w2Z
w1,w2,u,T
X=min{Q,eD}
Y=(min{Q,eD}-T)
+ Z=(eD -Q)
+
V(e)
Figure 4.1: Operations and Financial Transactions in the Supply chain
Figure 4.1 summarizes the sequence of operations and nancial transactions in the
supply chain, where the solid lines are product ows and the dotted lines are nancial
ows.
We assume that r is exogenous. This assumption is justied when a retailer is
a price taker as a result of a competitive market. Also, we assume w1 > c1 and
w2 > c2 to ensure positive margins for the manufacturer. In addition, we assume
c2 > c1 because the second production may require an expedition or acquisition
of additional capacity, and therefore incur extra cost. For simplicity, we assume
remaining inventory at the end of the selling season has zero value. Notice that under
the advance-purchase contract all demand will always be satised at the end of the
selling season.
Let D denote retailer's stochastic demand, which has a probability density func-
tion  (),  (D) > 0 for all D  0, and a cumulative distribution function  (),
where continuity and dierentiability are satised. The retailer can exert sales eort
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e, e  1, at a cost of V (e) to inuence demand in the multiplicative form, i.e., eD. We
assume V (e) is convex and increasing to model an increasing marginal cost of sales
eort. This type of eort-demand model is also used in Taylor [11] and Krishnan et
al. [4].
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The summary of the notations used in this chapter is presented in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Notation Summary
Notation Description
D Retailer's stochastic demand with PDF () and CDF ()
r Unit retail price
ci Unit production cost for manufacturer's i production opportunity, i =
f1; 2g
wi Unit wholesale price for retailer's i ordering opportunity, i = f1; 2g
u Unit rebate
T Target level of a rebate
QC Order quantity of a centralized supply chain
eC Eort level of a centralized supply chain
C Expected prot of a centralized supply chain
QA Order quantity under an advance-purchase contract
eA Eort level under an advance-purchase contract
Ai Expected prot of i under an advance-purchase contract, i = fM;Rg ,
denoting the manufacturer and retailer, respectively
QB Order quantity under an advance-purchase and target rebate contract
eB Eort level under an advance-purchase and target rebate contract
Bi Expected prot of i under an advance-purchase and target rebate con-
tract, i = fM;Rg
Q Optimal order quantity under an advance-purchase and target rebate
contract
e Optimal eort level under an advance-purchase and target rebate con-
tract
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4.1.2 Centralized Supply Chain
The centralized supply chain serves as the benchmark for comparisons of supply
chain's performance and retailer's decisions under coordination in the contract. In
the centralized supply chain, both the manufacturer and the retailer belong to the
same company. Two production opportunities are available. The rst opportunity
is available in advance with marginal cost c1, and the second opportunity becomes
available after the demand is realized with marginal cost c2 > c1. Let (x)
+ denote
maxfx; 0g. The expected prot of the supply chain is
C =  c1Q+ E

rmin fQ; eDg+ (r   c2) (eD  Q)+
	  V (e); (4.1)
where the rst term is the production cost of the rst order, the second term is the
revenue of the rst order, the third term is the prot of the second order, and the
last term is cost of sales eort. Let   (Q) =
R Q
0
Dd (D). The optimal eort level is
eC which satises (@=@e)V (e) = c2 
 
QC=e

+ (r   c2)EfDg, and the optimal order
quantity is QC = e 1 ((c2   c1) =c2). Note that  1 ((c2   c1) =c2) is the optimal
order quantity with the minimum sales eort. The derivation for such scenario can
be found in Appendix A.
4.1.3 Decentralized Retailer under Advance-Purchase Contract
In the decentralized supply chain, the manufacturer and retailer are independent.
Under the advance-purchase contract, the retailer has two opportunities to place her
orders: the rst order is placed in advance at a wholesale price w1, and the second
order is placed during the selling season at a wholesale price w2. Corresponding to
the two ordering opportunities of the retailer, the manufacturer has two production
opportunities. Under the advance-purchase contract, the manufacturer's expected
prot is
AM = (w1   c1)Q+ (w2   c2)E

(eD  Q)+	 ; (4.2)
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where the manufacturer makes prot from satisfying retailer's rst and second order-
ing opportunities, represented by the rst and second terms, respectively.
The retailer's expected prot is
AR =  w1Q+ E

rmin fQ; eDg+ (r   w2) (eD  Q)+
	  V (e) ; (4.3)
where the retailer pays a unit cost w1 for her rst order quantity Q, and sells them
at the retail price r, and places her second order quantity if necessary. Additionally,
the retailer pays the cost V (e) to exert a sales eort e to amplify her demand. By
using integrals, the retailer's expected prot can be expressed as follows:
AR = (r   w1)Q  r
Z Q=e
0
(Q  eD) d (D) + (r   w2)
Z 1
Q=e
(eD  Q) d (D)  V (e):
(4.4)
Thus, the rst order derivative with respect to Q is
(@=@Q)AR = r   w1   r (Q=e)  (r   w2) [1   (Q=e)] ; (4.5)
= w2   w1   w2 (Q=e) : (4.6)
The optimal eort level is eA which satises (@=@e)V (e) = w2 (Q
A=e)+(r w2)E fDg.
The optimal order quantity is QA = e 1 ((w2   w1) =w2), where  1 ((w2   w1)=w2)
is the retailer's optimal order quantity with the minimum sales eort. The derivation
for such scenario can be found in Appendix A.
4.1.4 Decentralized Retailer under Advance-Purchase and Target Rebate
Contract
In this section, we develop a new contract, called an advance-purchase and target
rebate contract, which is the integration of the advance-purchase contract and the
target rebate contract. This contract works similarly as the advance-purchase con-
tract, except the manufacturer uses a rebate mechanism to provide an incentive to
the retailer to increase her eort. Specically, the retailer earns a rebate u for every
unit she sells above the target level T .
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Under the advance-purchase and target rebate contract, the retailer's expected
prot is
BR =  w1Q+E

rmin fQ; eDg+ u (min fQ; eDg   T )+ + (r   w2) (eD  Q)+
	 V (e) :
(4.7)
To understand Eq. (4.7), the retailer pays w1Q to obtain her inventory, and sells
products at the retail price r, receives the rebate u from the manufacturer for every
unit from her inventory sold above the target level T , and makes prot of r   w2 for
each unit in her second order quantity, respectively. In addition, the retailer is able to
amplify her demand by exerting sales eort e at a cost of exertion V (e) to maximize
her expected prot.
The expected prot of the manufacturer is
BM = (w1   c1)Q+ E

(w2   c2) (eD  Q)+   u (min fQ; eDg   T )+
	
; (4.8)
where he makes prot from satisfying retailer's rst and second orders, and oering
the retailer an incentive through a target rebate. In the following, we follow the two-
step procedure to determine the characteristics of the retailer's optimal policies. In
this procedure, we rst determine the retailer's optimal ordering policy for any given
sales eort level, and later use the result to determine the retailer's optimal policy
on a sales eort. To facilitate the analysis, the retailer expected prot, shown in Eq.
(4.7), is alternatively expressed as
BR =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
(r   w1)Q  r
R Q=e
0
(Q  eD) d (D)
+ (r   w2)
R1
Q=e
(eD  Q) d (D)  V (e); if Q  T ;
(r   w1)Q  r
R Q=e
0
(Q  eD) d (D)
+u
R Q=e
T=e
(eD   T ) d (D) + (Q  T ) [1   (Q=e)]

+(r   w2)
R1
Q=e
(eD  Q) d (D)  V (e); if Q > T .
(4.9)
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The retailer's expected prot in Eq. (4.9) is isolated into two conditions, \without
rebate" and \with rebate", where a target rebate term exists in the latter, but does not
exist in the former. Next, we begin to characterize retailer's optimal order quantity
Q for any given e. The rst and second order derivatives of the retailers's expected
prot with respect to retailer's order quantity are
(@=@Q)BR =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
r   w1   r (Q=e)  (r   w2) [1   (Q=e)] ; if Q  T ;
r   w1   r (Q=e) + u [1   (Q=e)]
  (r   w2) [1   (Q=e)] ; if Q > T ,
(4.10)
=
8>><>>:
w2   w1   w2 (Q=e) ; if Q  T ;
w2 + u  w1   (w2 + u)  (Q=e) ; if Q > T ,
(4.11)
and
 
@2=@Q2

BR =
8>><>>:
 w2 (Q=e) 1=e; if Q  T ;
  (w2 + u) (Q=e) 1=e; if Q > T .
(4.12)
Thus, BR is concave on [0; T ) and (T;1). Although BR is continuous,
lim
Q!T 
(@=@Q)BR < lim
Q!T+
(@=@Q)BR: (4.13)
Dene QB  e 1 ((w2 + u  w1) =(w2 + u)). Note that QB > QA. Also, dene
f1 (T )  BR
 
QA; ejT  BR  QB; ejT on T 2 QA; QB, and dene 1, which is the
target level that makes the retailer indierent between \going for" and \not going
for" the rebate, i.e., f1 (1) = 0.
Lemma 4.1 For any given e, the optimal order quantity for the retailer under an
advance-purchase and target rebate contract, Q, is given by the following: If 1 < T ,
then Q = QA; if 1 > T , then Q = QB; if 1 = T , then the retailer is indierent
between ordering QA and QB.
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Proof. It is straightforward to show that if T  QA, then QB maximizes BR (; ejT ),
and if T  QB, thenQA maximizes BR (; ejT ). IfQA  T  QB, then BR
 
QA; ejT =
ew2 
 
QA=e

+ e (r   w2)E fDg   V (e) and BR
 
QB; ejT = e (w2 + u)    QB=e  
u [e  (T=e) + T (1   (T=e))] + e (r   w2)E fDg   V (e). Because f1
 
QA

< 0 <
f1
 
QB

and f1 () is continuous and increasing, there exists a single-valued inverse
function f 11 and a unique 1; further, 1 2
 
QA; QB

. If QA < T < QB, then limQ!T 
(@=@Q)BR (Q; ejT ) < 0 < limQ!T+ (@=@Q)BR (Q; ejT ). Because QA maximizes
BR (; ejT ) on [0; T ) and QB maximizes BR (; ejT ) on (T;1], Q = argmaxQ2fQA;QBg
BR(Q; ejT ). If T < 1, then f1 (T ) < 0 and BR
 
QB; ejT > BR  QA; ejT. If T > 1,
then f1 (T ) > 0.
To understand the intuition behind Lemma 4.1, let's consider two extreme cases of T .
When T is extremely low, e.g., equals to 0, the retailer gets a rebate of u for every unit
that she sold. The retailer optimal order quantity can be derived with the margin of
r+u w. When T is extremely high, the retailer has to exert a considerable amount
of sales eort to have a shot at getting the rebate. However, the cost of sales eort
exceeds the expected revenue from the rebate. As a result, the retailer behaves as if
the rebate does not exist. When T is intermediate, the retailer considers her marginal
cost and revenue to decide whether or not she wants to go for the rebate. There is an
optimal order quantity associated with each case. As T increases, the incentive from
the rebate decreases, and when T = 1, she is indierent between placing the large
and small orders.
Corollary 4.1 shows this threshold is the multiplication of an eort level e and a
similar threshold under the no-sales-eort scenario. Let 0 be analogous to 1 when
the retailer exerts minimum sales eort. The derivation and proof of existence and
uniqueness for 0 can be found in Appendix A.
Corollary 4.1 1 = e0:
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Proof. BecauseQA = e 1 ((w2   w1) =w2) andQB = e 1 ((w2 + u  w1) =(w2 + u)),
which are the multiplication of e and the retailer's optimal order quantity when sales
eort is minimum in each respective case, 1 = e0.
Lemma 4.1 and Corollary 4.1 suggest that the retailer's expected prot under the
advance-purchase and target rebate contract can be expressed as a function of a
single decision variable, a sales eort level e. Next, we characterize the optimal level
of the sales eort. Let Q (e) denote the retailer's optimal quantity given sales eort
level e. Then,
BR(Q
(e); ejT ) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
w2e 
 
QA=e

+ (r   w2) eE fDg   V (e); if e  T=0;
(w2 + u) e 
 
QB=e
  u (e  (T=e) + T [1   (T=e)])
+ (r   w2) eE fDg   V (e); if e > T=0.
(4.14)
Thus, the rst and second order derivatives with respect to e are
(@=@e)BR(Q
(e); ejT ) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
w2 
 
QA=e

+ (r   w2)E fDg   (@=@e)V (e); if e  T=0;
(w2 + u)  
 
QB=e
  u  (T=e)
+ (r   w2)E fDg   (@=@e)V (e); if e > T=0,
(4.15)
and
 
@2=@e2

BR(Q
(e); ejT ) =
8>><>>:
  (@2=@e2)V (e); if e  T=0;
e 3uT 2 (T=e)  (@2=@e2)V (e); if e > T=0.
(4.16)
Although BR(Q
(e); ejT ) is continuous,
lim
e!(T=0) 
(@=@e)BR(Q
(e); ejT ) < lim
e!(T=0)+
(@=@e)BR(Q
(e); ejT ): (4.17)
Therefore, T=0 cannot be an optimal sales eort level, and 
B
R(Q
(e); ejT ) is not
dierentiable at T=0.
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To obtain further analytical results, we assume the demand follows the uniform
distribution between 0 and 1, i.e., D  Uniform(0,1), and the cost of sales eort,
V (e) = ae2=2, where a > 0. In the following, we show there exists a unique threshold
 such that if the target level exceeds that threshold, then the retailer behaves as
if the rebate does not exist, i.e., the optimal sales eort level and the optimal order
quantity fall equal to those in the without-rebate case. If the target level is below the
threshold, then the optimal eort level and the optimal order quantity are greater
than those in the without-rebate case. If the target level equals the threshold, then
the retailer is indierent between the high and low eort-quantity pairs (see Corollary
4.2).
The analysis of retailer's optimal sales eort level proceeds in two steps. First, we
show in Lemma 4.2 that the objective function, BR(Q
(); jT ), is concave on [0; T=0)
and either convex and then concave or simply concave on (T=0;1). Second, we use
that result to specify the optimal eort level in Lemma 4.3.
Lemma 4.2 If T < u 30 =a, then 
B
R(Q
(e); ejT ) is concave in [0; T=0) and ([uT 2=a]1=3
;1) and convex in (T=0; [uT 2=a]1=3); if T  u 30 =a, then BR(Q(e); ejT ) is concave
in [0; T=0) and (T=0;1).
Proof. For e 2 [0; T=0), (@2=@e2)BR(Q(e); ejT ) =  a < 0. For e 2 (T=0;1),
(@2=@e2) BR(Q
(e); ejT ) = uT 2e 3 a. If T  u 30 =a, then uT 2e 3 a < u 30 =T  a 
0. Suppose T < u 30 =a. Note uT
2e 3   a > 0 if and only if e < (uT 2=a)1=3.
A consequence of Lemma 4.2 is that lime!1BR(Q
(e); ejT ) =  1, and BR(Q(e); ejT )
has one maximizer in [0; T=0] and at most one maximizer in (T=0;1). Denote
the maximizer on [0; T=0] by ~e. Let e
B be the maximizer on (T=0;1), if it ex-
ists; let eB = T=0 if no such maximizer exists. Note ~e = min

eA; T=0
	
. Dene
j(T )  BR(Q(~e); ~ejT ) BR(Q(eB); eBjT ) on [0eA;1) to represent the dierence in
the retailer's prot when exerting the optimal sales eort level of the supply chains
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with and without a rebate. In addition, dene  to satisfy j() = 0, i.e., the target
level threshold that makes the retailer indierent between exerting the optimal eort
level of the supply chains with and without a rebate.
Lemma 4.3 Suppose D  Uniform(0,1). There exists a unique  such that if T <
, then e = eB and further eB > T=0; if T > , then e = eA and further
eA < T=0; if T = , then the optimal sales eort level is indierent between e
A and
eB and further eA < T=0 < e
B.
Proof. It can be veried that BR(Q
(eB); eBj) is decreasing, and BR(Q(~e); ~ej) is
weakly increasing. Therefore, j() is increasing. If T  0eA, then 0  lime!(T=0) 
(@=@e)BR(Q
(e); ejT ) < lime!(T=0)+(@=@e)BR(Q(e); ejT ). Because BR(Q(); jT ) is
concave on [0; T=0) and lime!(T=0)  (@=@e)
B
R(Q
(e); ejT )  0,
(@=@e)BR(Q
(e); ejT )je2[0;T=0)> 0. Because lime!(T=0)+(@=@e)BR(Q(e); ejT ) > 0,
BR(Q
(); jT ) has one stationary point on (T=0;1), and the second-order condition
is satised at that point. Therefore, BR(Q
(eB); eBj) > BR(Q(~e); ~ej) and j(0eA) <
0. Clearly, limT!1BR(Q
(~e); ~ejT ) = limT!1BR(Q(eA); eAjT ) = AR(QA; eA) < 1.
It can be veried that j() is continuous, and limT!1BR(Q(eB); eBjT ) =  1; thus,
limT!1 j(T ) = +1. Because j() is continuous and increasing, j(0eA) < 0, and
limT!1 j(T ) = +1, there exists a single-valued inverse function j 1 and a unique
; further  2 (0eA;1). Recall e = T=0 cannot be the optimal eort level. Thus,
if T < , then BR(Q
(eB); eBjT ) > BR(Q(~e); ~ejT ) and e = eB > T=0; if T > ,
then BR(Q
(eB); eBjT ) < BR(Q(~e); ~ejT ) and e = eA < T=0; if T = , then
BR(Q
(eB); eBjT ) = BR(Q(~e); ~ejT ) and e = eB or eA.
The results from Lemmas 4.1 and 4.3 directly yield the result in Corollary 4.2, which
species the retailer's optimal order quantity and sales eort.
Corollary 4.2 Suppose D  Uniform(0,1). If T < , then e = eB and Q = QB; if
T > , then e = eA and Q = QA; if T = , then the retailer is indierent between
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(eA; QA) and (eB; QB).
Corollary 4.2 shows that there exists the threshold for T , above which the retailer's
optimal decisions in the \without-rebate" case are optimal, and under which the
retailer's optimal decisions in the \with-rebate" case are optimal. The intuition is
the retailer behaves as if the rebate does not exist when the target level is high, and
takes an incentive of a rebate into consideration when the target level is low.
4.2 Supply Chain Coordination
In this section, we design the contract to coordinate the ordering and sales eort de-
cisions. Under the advance-purchase and target rebate contract (w1; u(T ); w2(T ); T ),
let L(T ) be the retailer's expected prot when she exerts eort eC where eC > T=0,
and let L(T;w1) be the retailer's expected prot when she exerts eort e
A where
eA < T=0.
Theorem 4.1 For any  2 (0;C(QC ; eC)), under the advance-purchase and target
rebate contract (w1, u(T ), w2(T ), T ), the supply chain coordination can be achieved
when u = u (T ); w2 = w2 (T ); T , and w1 are set such that L (T
; w1) = L (T
; w1)+
 = , and w1  w2, where  is sucient small, and
u(T ) =
(c1   2c2)(c1   w1)2
c2 [2   (T )] ; (4.18)
w2(T ) =
w1

((c1   c2))2   c22(T )
  c21(c1   2c2)2
c1c2 [2   (T )] ; (4.19)
where  = (c21   2c1c2 + c2r), and (T ) = 4a2c22T 2.
Proof. Dene y(T ) = L(T )   L(T ), and y(T ) = 0. It can be veried that (@=@w1)
L(T;w1) < 0, L(T; c1) = 
C , and L(T; ) is continuous. Hence, for a given T there
exists a single-valued inverse function with respect to w1, L
 1, and a unique w1(T )
such that L(T;w1(T )) =   .
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Dene T1 = e
A0 and T2 = e
C0. Because e
A < eC , T1 < T2. For T <
T2, we have e
C > T=0, and hence (@=@e)
B
R(Q
(e); ejT )je=eC= 0 because u =
u(T ) and w2 = w2(T ). For T > T1, we have e
A < T=0, and 
B
R(Q
(~e); ~ejT ) =
L(T ). Because lime!eA+(@=@e)
B
R(Q
(e); ejT1) > 0, BR(Q(); jT ) is convex and
then concave or simply concave, and eC > T1=0(T1), 
B
R(Q
(eB); eBjT1) = L(T1),
and L(T1) > L(T1); hence y(T1) < 0. Because lime!eC (@=@e)
B
R(Q
(e); ejT2) <
lime!eC+(@=@e)
B
R(Q
(e); ejT2) = 0, thus BR(Q(~e); ~ejT2) = L(T2) > L(T2); hence
y(T2) > 0. Because y(T1) < 0 < y(T2) and y() is continuous, there exists T 
and eA0(T
) < T  < eC0(T ). Because T  < eC0, eC is a stationary point
of BR(Q
(); jT ) on (T =0(T );1). Because BR(Q(); jT ) may be convex and
then concave, there may be a second stationary point on (T =0(T );1), denoted by
e0 if existing. This is true only if (@=@e)
B
R(Q
(e); ejT )je=(T =0(T ))+< 0. Then,
BR(Q
(e0); e0jT ) < BR(Q(~e); ~ejT ) = BR(Q(eA); eAjT ). Because BR(Q(eC);
eC jT ) = L(T ) > L(T ) = BR(Q(eA); eAjT ) > BR(Q(e0); e0jT ), eC = argmax
BR(Q
(e); ejT ).
Because eC > T =0(T ), Q = QB (by Lemma 4.1). Because u = u(T ) and
w2 = w2(T
), QB = QC , and thus Q = QC .
The supply chain achieves coordination when the retailer places the optimal order
quantity and exerts the optimal sales eort. Under the advance-purchase and target
rebate contract, her optimal decision depends on a target level T : when T is su-
ciently high, she makes the decision as if the target rebate does not exist, i.e., ordering
QA and exerting eA, and when T is suciently low, she makes the decision consider-
ing an incentive provided under the target rebate, i.e., ordering QB and exerting eB.
The manufacturer ensures supply chain coordination and a Pareto improvement by
setting w1 = w

1 and T = T
 because u = u(T ) in Eq. (4.18) and w2 = w2(T ) in
Eq. (4.19), QB = QC and eB = eC .
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4.3 Sensitivity Analysis
Proposition 4.1 shows the impact of w1 and T on a coordinating u(T ) and w2(T ).
Proposition 4.1 (a) u(T ) is increasing in T ; and u(T ) is increasing in w1 if 
2=(T )
> 1, and is decreasing in w1 if 
2=(T ) < 1. (b) w2(T ) is decreasing in T ; and
w2(T ) is increasing in w1 if 
2=(T ) < 1, and is decreasing in w1 if 1 < 
2=(T ) <
c22=(c2   c1)2.
Proof. @u=@w1 = (2c2   c1)22=c2(2   (T )). If 2=(T ) > 1, then @u=@w1 > 0.
Otherwise, @u=@w1 < 0. @u=@T = 8a
2c2T (2c2   c1)(w1   c1)2=(2   (T ))2 > 0.
@w2=@w1 = (c2   c1)22   c22(T )=c1c2(2   (T )). If 2=(T ) < 1, then (c2  
c1)
22   c22(T ) < 0 and c1c2(2   (T )) < 0. Hence, @w2=@w1 > 0. If 2=(T ) >
c22=(c2   c1)2, then @w2=@w1 > 0. If 1 < 2=(T ) < c22=(c2   c1)2, then @w2=@w1 < 0.
@w2=@T =  8a2c2T (2c2   c1)(w1   c1)2=(2   (T ))2 < 0.
2=(T ) can be considered as the value of T relative to the values of the market
parameters. The results in Proposition 4.1 can be described as follows. For the
impacts of T , to maintain the incentive level as T increases, u increases and w2
decreases. The impacts of w1 on u and w2 are dependent of T . First, for a suciently
high T such that 2=(T ) < 1, the retailer makes decisions as if the target rebate
contract does not exist. Thus, u is decreasing in w1, and w2 is increasing in w1, where
the former is to show the reduced impact of the rebate contract, and the latter is
to oer the incentive to the retailer. Second, for a suciently low T , the retailer
considers the incentives of both the target rebate contract and the advance-purchase
contract when making her decisions. When 1 < 2=(T ), u is increasing and w2 is
decreasing in w1, to maintain the incentive level. Further, when T is relatively small
such that c22=(c2   c1)2 < 2=(T ), u is also small, and as a result the incentive of
the target rebate is insucient. In this case, w2 is increasing in w1 to supplement the
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incentive.
When u(T ) and w2(T ) deviate from those given in Eqs. (4.18) and (4.19), respec-
tively, the advance-purchase contract and target rebate does not achieve supply chain
coordination, and their eects on the retailer's optimal decisions, i.e., e and Q, are
summarized in Proposition 4.2. We include only the case when T 6=  because when
T =  the optimal decision can take multiple values.
Proposition 4.2 Suppose D  Uniform(0,1), and T 6= . (a) e is constant in u
if T > , and is increasing in u if T < . Q is constant in u if T > , and is
increasing in u if T < . (b) e is decreasing in w2. When T > , Q is increasing
in w2 if 2w
2
1 + rw2 > 3w1w2, and is decreasing in w2 if 2w
2
1 + rw2 < 3w1w2. When
T < , Q is increasing in w2 if eBw1=(w2+u)2+(w2+u w1)=(w2+u)@eB=@w2 > 0,
and is decreasing if eBw1=(w2 + u)
2 + (w2 + u  w1)=(w2 + u)@eB=@w2 < 0.
Proof. If T > , then e = eA and Q = QA, which are independent of u. Hence,
@eA=@u = 0 and @QA=@u = 0. @eA=@w2 =  w21=(2aw22) < 0. @QA=@w2 = w1(2w21 +
rw2   3w1w2)=(2aw32). If T < , then e = eB. By Implicit Function Theorem,
@eB=@u =  [(@2=@e@u)A]=[(@2=@2e)A]je=eB . Because (@2=@e@u)A > 0, @eB=@u > 0.
Similarly, @eB=@w2 =  [(@2=@e@w2)A]=[(@2=@2e)A]je=eB . Because (@2=@e@w2)A < 0,
@eB=@w2 < 0. If T < , then Q
 = QB. @[(w2+ u w1)=(w2+ u)]=@u = @[(w2+ u 
w1)=(w2+ u)]=@w2 = w1=(w2+ u)
2 > 0. Hence, @QB=@u = eB(w1=(w2+ u)
2) + (w2+
u w1)=(w2+u)@eB=@u > 0, and @QB=@w2 = eBw1=(w2+u)2+(w2+u w1)=(w2+
u)@eB=@w2.
Intuitively, when the manufacturer provides larger u, the retailer exerts more sales
eort and places a larger order. Then, when the manufacturer increases w2, the
retailer lowers her sales eort due to a decrease in prot margin in her second ordering
opportunity. Also, when the target level is suciently high, the retailer relatively
compares the retailer price to w1 and w2 to decide whether or not to decrease or
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increase her order quantity. When the target level is suciently low, the retailer
consider the total eect to decide her order quantity. Two eects are pulling in two
opposite directions. Note that e is decreasing in w2, but Q
B is increasing in w2.
4.4 Numerical Analysis
In this section, we numerically compare the performance of the coordinating contract
to that in the newsvendor and the target rebate-only contract cases. Let's assume
retailer's demand follows the uniform distribution between 0 and 200, and consider
the following example to demonstrate numerical results.
Table 4.2: Parameters for the Numerical Example
Coordination Newsvendor Target Rebate-Only
Exogenous parameters: r 40 40 40
c1 10 - -
c2 20 - -
c - 10 10
a 20 20 20
Decision variables: w1 21 - -
w2 24.11 - -
u 17.89 - -
T 6965.50 - -
wb - 16 -
wd - - 16.65
ud - - 15
T d - - 10000
The model formulation of the supply chain under the target rebate-only contract
can be found in Appendix A. For the centralization, we use the same values of market
parameters under coordination. Note that \-" means the parameters or variables
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are not applicable. Also, the contract parameters under coordination satisfy the
coordinating conditions in Theorem 4.1.
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Figure 4.2: Prot Comparison
Figure 4.2 compares the total supply chain prots under four scenarios, i.e., cen-
tralization, coordination, target rebate-only contract and newsvendor, and reveals
the following insights. Firstly, the total prot curves under coordination and under
centralization overlap, and hence the retailer's optimal order quantity under both sce-
narios are identical. Secondly, the supply chain prot under coordination is always
higher than those under target rebate-only contract and newsvendor. This describes
the improvement from including the advance-purchase contract. Lastly, the optimal
order quantity of the supply chain under coordination is lower than that under the
target rebate-only contract and newsvendor. The intuition is that the second ordering
opportunity inserts a prot margin when fullling the demand from the second order,
and as a result lowers an incentive to satisfy the demand from inventory.
Figure 5.5 shows the supply chain prot, the manufacturer's prot and the re-
tailer's prot under coordination.
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Figure 4.3: Prots under Coordination
Figure 5.5 shows the coordinating contract achieves supply chain coordination,
i.e., the optimal order quantity of the retailer under coordination is identical to the
optimal order quantity of the supply chain.
Figures 4.4 and 4.5 respectively show the retailer's and manufacturer's prots
under coordination, the target rebate-only contract and newsvendor.
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Figure 4.4: Retailer's Prot Comparison
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Figure 4.5: Manufacturer's Prot Comparison
In Figure 4.4, the retailer decides the optimal eort level and the optimal order
quantity in each scenario, which accordingly determines the corresponding manufac-
turer's prot, highlighted in Figure 4.5. These two gures show the coordinating
contract results in the Pareto improvement.
We now present coordinating contracts and exhibit arbitrary prot splitting in
Table 4.3. Let C = C(QC ; eC), and BR = 
B
R(Q
; e). For the centralized supply
chain, C , QC and eC are 160,968.72, 12,500 and 125, respectively.
Table 4.3: Coordinating Contracts and Arbitrarily Prot Splitting
BR w1 u T w2
0.28C 27.40 27.40 5436.33 27.40
0.30C 26.25 25.70 5667.86 26.80
0.50C 19.31 15.34 7496.33 23.28
0.70C 14.75 8.29 9362.92 21.21
0.90C 11.40 2.52 10210.33 20.28
0.99C 10.15 0.30 12376.81 20.00
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In Table 4.3, the resulting prots of the retailer under the advance-purchase dis-
count contract BR are carried out by the percentage of the total prot of the central-
ized supply chain, and for each of those prots, the associated coordinating contract
is presented.
Table 4.3 suggests that to allocate more prot to the retailer, the manufacturer
lowers w1 and w2, while the retailer compromises on a less attractive rebate, a lower
u and a higher T . In contrast, the manufacturer increases w1 and w2 to receive a
higher prot share, and makes the rebate more attractive by raising u and lower T to
retain the coordination. This result resembles that in Taylor [11] although we replace
his buy-back contract with the advance-purchase contract.
Further, it can also be observed in Table 4.3 that to oer the retailer a signicantly
small amount of prot, the assumption, w1 < w2, may be violated. Hence, arbitrary
prot split is not fully exible in this parameter setting.1 The intuition behind this
outcome is that when w1 becomes suciently large the retailer dramatically reduces
her order size, and heavily relies on her second order opportunity. In order to induce
the optimal order quantity, the manufacturer provides compensation through a rebate
by increasing u and lowering T .
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, we study a decentralized supply chain with a manufacturer and
a retailer who faces a stochastic eort-dependent demand. The sales eort incurs
exertion cost and is non-contractible because the cost for sales eort is dicult to
verify by the manufacturer, and thus is hard to be shared proportionally by the
manufacturer.
To coordinate the supply chain, we study an advance-purchase and target rebate
1We also perform the analysis with a dierent set of market parameters, and are able to achieve
fully-exible arbitrary prot split.
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contract to establish a new contract, called an advance-purchase and target rebate
contract. Under this contract, the retailer has two opportunities to place order at
two dierent wholesale prices to satisfy the demand. The rst ordering opportunity is
available prior to demand observation, and the second ordering opportunity becomes
available after demand observation during the selling season. Correspondingly, the
manufacturer also has two production opportunities with two dierent marginal costs.
As opposed to other coordinating approaches, such as a buy-back contract or lost
sale penalty, the advance-purchase contract is preferable in some industries because
of its practical advantages. For example, some products when returned may require
lengthly and/or costly processes or become worthless, and therefore executing a buy-
back may not be worthwhile and desirable by both players. In addition, a lost sale
is dicult to tract, especially with today's advanced e-commerce technology, where
a product may be out of stock, and a lost sale is never reported.
We show that supply chain coordination with arbitrary prot split and Pareto
improvements are achievable. In this approach, the manufacturer ensures the re-
tailer's optimal decisions by properly specifying the rebate, target level and wholesale
prices to assure a win-win situation. Numerical results show that the inclusion of the
advance-purchase contract greatly improves supply chain prot even though it lowers
the supply chain's and retailer's optimal order quantities. In addition, the contract
has sucient exibility for arbitrary prot split.
There are multiple possible directions for future research. One of which is to
eliminate such possibility to assure fully-exible arbitrary prot split. The second
direction is to establish a new contract which allows the players to share the cost of
sales eort. Also, it would be interesting to see results when demand is both sales-
eort and retail-price dependent, or a demand-eort model takes a dierent form.
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CHAPTER 5
Supply Chain Coordination with Transshipment and Advance-Purchase
Contract
In this chapter, we analyze impacts of the advance-purchase contract on a supply
chain with transshipment. The supply chain consists of a manufacturer and two
retailers who face stochastic demand for a single product in a single selling-season.
The manufacturer facilitates transshipment between the two retailers. This problem
is particularly of our interest because it is unclear how transshipment would inuence
manufacturer's and retailers' decisions, and whether or not supply chain coordination
is achievable. In general, the impact of transshipment is two-folded since a retailer
might place a smaller order as she hopes to rely on transshipment from another retailer
to satisfy her unmet demand. Alternatively, she might place a larger order as she
hopes to make prot from accepting a transshipment request from the other retailer.
With an advance-purchase contract, this problem has become more complicated. We
study how such contract inuences the manufacturer's and retailers' decisions and
performance of the supply chain, and design a contract to coordinate an ordering
decision and allow an arbitrary prot split.
5.1 Model Formulation
5.1.1 Notation
We study a supply chain with a manufacturer and two retailers selling the same prod-
uct in two regions. Throughout this chapter, we use the subscripts i and j to refer
to these two retailers, and suppress the terms, i = f1; 2g and i; j = f1; 2g; i 6= j, for
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short when referencing to retailer i, and retailer i and j, respectively. The manufac-
turer oers the advance-purchase contract to the retailers, and allows transshipment
between the retailers to satisfy demand if he/she faces a stock-out situation. Under
the advance-purchase contract, the manufacturer provides two ordering opportunities
to the retailers: one before the selling season, and the other one during the selling
season. The manufacturer has two production opportunities corresponding to the two
ordering opportunities. Retailer i then sells products at a retail price ri to satisfy
customers' demand in region i, Di. The demand in the two regions are i.i.d with a
probability density function  (),  (Di) > 0 for allDi  0, and a cumulative distribu-
tion function  (). The retail prices are assumed to be exogenous. This assumption
is justied when a retailer is a price taker as a result of a competitive market. For
simplicity, we also assume the remaining inventory at the end of the selling season
has zero value.
The manufacturer and the retailers follow the following sequence of events. In
Stage 1, retailer i places her rst order to the manufacturer at a wholesale price w1
to obtain products. Each unit in this order is produced at marginal cost c1. As
soon as the retailer receives her inventory in Stage 2, she immediately satises her
demand. In Stage 3, if she needs more supply, then she submits a transshipment
request to retailer j. If the transshipment request is accepted, then retailer i pays
a transshipment price cji to retailer j for every transshipped unit. To facilitate this
transshipment, the manufacturer charges retailer j a unit transportation cost ji and
retailer i a unit transshipment premium i. This is justied because the manufacturer
provides transportation for transshipment, and charges the premium for cost of re-
branding products. In Stage 4, if retailer i still requires more products, then she
places her second order to the manufacturer at a unit wholesale price w2 to obtain
products. Each unit in this order is produced at marginal cost c2.
We assume c2 > c1 because the second production may require an expedition and
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therefore incur extra cost. We also assume w1  c1 and w2  c2 to ensure positive
prot margins of the manufacturer. To guarantee that transshipment is preferred to
the second order, we assume cji + i < w2. Notice that under the advance-purchase
contract all demand will always be satised at the end of the selling season.
We summarize the sequence of operations and nancial transactions in the supply
chain in Figure 5.1, where the solid lines are product ows and the dotted lines are
nancial ows.
First Stage: RETs place first order.
MFG starts production.
Second Stage: MFG distributes products.
RETs satisfy customer demand.
Third Stage: RETs execute transshipment.
RETs satisfy customer demand.
Fourth Stage: RETs place second order.
MFG produces and distributes products.
RETs satisfy customer demand.
MFG
RET1 RET2
MFG
RET1 RET2
MFG
RET1 RET2
RET1 RET2
MFG
w1Q1 w1Q2
Xi=min{Qi,Di}
Q2Q1
X1 X2r2X2r1X1
?2T12 ?1T21
?21T21?12T12 T12
T21
c21T21
c12T12
r1T21
r2T12T12
T21
w2Z2w2Z1
Z1 Z2r1Z1 r2Z2
Z1 Z2
Figure 5.1: Operations and Financial Transactions in the Supply chain
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The summary of the notation used in this chapter is presented in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Notation Summary
Notation Description
c1 Unit manufacturing cost in manufacturer's rst production
c2 Unit manufacturing cost in manufacturer's second production
ri Unit retail price of retailer i
ij Unit transportation cost paid by retailer i for transshipment to retailer
j
Qi First order quantity of retailer i
Tij
Expected transshipment quantity sent from retailer i to retailer j
Zi Expected unmet demand at retailer i, after satisfying demand from
transshipment
c Expected prot of a centralized supply chain
dRi Expected prot of retailer i under decentralization
dR Expected total prot of retailers under decentralization,
P
i=1;2 
d
Ri
dM Expected prot of a manufacturer under decentralization
w1 Unit wholesale price in retailers' rst ordering opportunity
w2 Unit wholesale price in retailers' second ordering opportunity
cij Unit transshipment price paid by retailer j for transshipment from
retailer i
 Unit transshipment premium paid by a retailer to a manufacturer
 Prot split parameter
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5.1.2 Centralized Supply Chain
The centralized supply chain serves as the benchmark to compare supply chain's
performance and retailers' optimal decision under coordination when deriving a co-
ordinating contract. Under centralization, the entire supply chain belongs to a single
rm. Let x+ = max fx; 0g. Dene Tij = min

(Qi  Di)+ ; (Dj  Qj)+
	
to represent
transshipment quantity from retailer i to retailer j, and Zi = Di (min fDi; Qig+Tji)
to represent the remaining demand of retailer i after transshipment. The supply
chain's expected prot is given by
c = E
8>><>>:
X
i=1;2
rimin fDi; Qig+
X
i;j=1;2
i 6=j
(rj   ij)Tij +
X
i=1;2
(ri   c2)Zi
9>>=>>;  c1
X
i=1;2
Qi:
(5.1)
The rst, second and third terms in Eq. (5.1) are revenues from satisfying demand
from inventory, from transshipment and from the second order, respectively. The
last term is the procurement cost. Plugging in the denition Zi into Eq. (5.1) and
rearrangement yield
c = E
8>><>>:
X
i=1;2
c2min fDi; Qig+
X
i;j=1;2
i6=j
(c2   ij)Tij +
X
i=1;2
(ri   c2)Di
9>>=>>;  c1
X
i=1;2
Qi:
(5.2)
The optimal solution of Eq. (5.2) satises the following condition,
F (Qi) =
c2   c1
c2
+
c2   ij
c2
@ETij
@Qi
+
c2   ji
c2
@ETji
@Qi
= 0; for i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j: (5.3)
5.1.3 Decentralized Supply Chain
When retailers are independent, each party in the supply chain attempts to maximize
his or her own prot. Under an advance-purchase contract, the manufacturer designs
a contract by specifying contract parameters, i.e., w1; w2; cij; cji; , to coordinate the
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supply chain. His expected prot is
dM = (w1   c1)
X
i=1;2
Qi + E
8>><>>:
X
i;j=1;2
i6=j
Tij + (w2   c2)
X
i=1;2
Zi
9>>=>>; : (5.4)
The three terms are the prots from satisfying retailers' rst order, from receiving
the transshipment premium, and from satisfying retailers' second order, respectively.
Given a contract, retailer i, i = 1; 2, then decides an order quantity Qi to maximize
her expected prot
dRi = E frimin fDi; Qig+ (ri   cji   )Tji + (cij   ij)Tij + (ri   w2)Zig   w1Qi:
(5.5)
The rst four terms in Eq. (5.5) are the revenues by satisfying demand from her
inventory, by satisfying demand from receiving transshipment, by providing trans-
shipment, and by satisfying demand from her second order, respectively. The last
term is the procurement cost. Note that without an advance-purchase contract, re-
tailer's expected prot is identical to dRi in Eq. (5.5) with Zi = 0, representing the
absence of the second order.
The optimal order quantity, Qi, of Eq. (5.5) satises the following conditions,
F (Qi) =
w2   w1
w2
+
cij   ij
w2
@ETij
@Qi
+
w2   cji   
w2
@ETji
@Qi
= 0; for i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j:
(5.6)
The summation of the expected prot of the retailers is
dR =
X
i=1;2
dRi
= E
8>><>>:
X
i=1;2
w2min fDi; Qig+
X
i;j=1;2
i6=j
(w2   ji   )Tji
+
X
i=1;2
(ri   w2)Di
)
  w1
X
i=1;2
Qi: (5.7)
54
In the next section, we develop a mechanism and a contract that achieve supply chain
coordination with arbitrary prot split, and assures a win-win situation.
5.2 Supply Chain Coordination
Our objective in this section is to design a contract to coordinate a supply chain with
transshipment, and leads to a Pareto improvement. The coordinating mechanism
follows in two steps. In the rst step, the manufacturer uses the two wholesale prices
and the transshipment premium to split total expected prot of the supply chain
into two portions: one for himself and the other for the two retailers as elaborated in
Theorem 5.1. Then the retailers use transshipment prices to further split the second
portion as described in Theorem 5.2.
Let  =
P
i=1;2 riDi denote expected total supply chain revenue.
Theorem 5.1 Let  be a parameter set by the manufacturer for an arbitrary prot
split. Supply chain coordination can be achieved by setting w1, w2 and i to satisfy
the following conditions:
w1 = c1; (5.8)
w2 = c2; (5.9)
i = (  1) ij; (5.10)
where 1    =(  c).
Proof. Applying coordination conditions in Eqs. (5.8), (5.9) and (5.10) to Eq. (5.7),
we obtain
dR = 
c + (1  ); (5.11)
dM = (1  ) c   (1  ): (5.12)
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Eq. (5.11) shows that retailer's optimal decision is also supply chain's optimal deci-
sion. Furthermore, it is easy to verify that dM  0 if and only if   1, and dR  0
if and only if   =(  c). Therefore, the valid range of  for supply chain
coordination is
1    
  c : (5.13)
Rudi et al. [3] show Nash equilibrium, the solution to a traditional transshipment
game, is unique. Likewise, a similar proof can be constructed to show a uniqueness
of Nash equilibrium, Qi given by Eq. (5.6), for our coordination game.
Let's denote
i(Qi) = Pr(Di < Qi); (5.14)
i(Qi; Qj) = Pr(Qi +Qj  Dj < Di < Qi); (5.15)
i(Qi; Qj) = Pr(Qi < Di < Qi +Qj  Dj); (5.16)
graphically shown in Figure 5.2
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Figure 5.2: Graphical Illustration of Probabilities
We use the same probability notations dened in Rudi et al. [3] to derive optimal
transshipment prices. These probabilities are associated with the events for a given
Qi and Qj. i is for the scenario that retailer i has excess inventory. i is for the
scenario that retailer i has excess inventory, but the total retailers' inventory is less
than the total retailers' demand. In this case, retailer j receives transshipment from
retailer i, but will not be able to fully satisfy her unmet demand. i is for the scenario
that retailer i is stock out, and the total retailers' inventory is more than the total
retailers' demand. In this case, retailer i receives transshipment from retailer j, and
will be able to completely satisfy her unmet demand. In Theorem 5.2, we derive the
coordinating transshipment prices.
Theorem 5.2 Given the contract parameters specied in Theorem 5.1, supply chain
coordination can be achieved by setting transshipment prices
cij =
(w2   ) ij + (ji   w2 + ) ji   ijij
ij   ij : (5.17)
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Proof. From Eq. (5.7), setting @dR=@Qi = 0 yields
i +
(w2   ji   )
w2
i   (w2   ij   )
w2
i =
w2   w1
w2
; for i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j: (5.18)
From Eq. (5.5), setting @dRi=@Qi = 0 yields
i +
(w2   cji   )
w2
i   (cij   ij)
w2
i =
w2   w1
w2
; for i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j: (5.19)
By equating the left-hand sides of Eqs. (5.18) and (5.19) with the following
transshipment prices, retailer i's optimal order quantity is also optimal for dR.
cij =
(w2   ) ij + (ji   w2 + ) ji   ijij
ij   ij : (5.20)
The parameters (w1; w

2; 
; cij; c

ji) of a coordinating contract are dened by Eqs.
(5.8), (5.9), (5.10) and (5.17). In the following, we study the properties of the pro-
posed coordinating contract.
Proposition 5.1 Given a contract (w1; w

2; 
; cij; c

ji), retailers' optimal order quan-
tity Qi is independent of . In addition, retailers' optimal ordering decision is also
optimal to the supply chain.
Proof. Eq. (5.11) shows dR is linearly proportional to 
c. Hence, retailers' optimal
order quantity Qi is independent of . Substituting contract parameters in Eqs. (5.8),
(5.9), (5.10) and (5.17) into Eq. (5.6), and arranging yield Eq. (5.3).
Proposition 5.1 shows the supply chain prot can be split arbitrarily, which is neces-
sary to achieve Pareto improvements. If the manufacturer properly sets the contract
parameters and allows the retailers to make their ordering decision freely, Proposition
5.1 assures that retailers' optimal ordering decision is also optimal for the whole sup-
ply chain. By Propositions 5.1, a coordinating contract achieves an arbitrary prot
split and Pareto improvements.
Proposition 5.2 characterizes the role of  in the arbitrary prot split.
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Proposition 5.2 There exists , below which a manufacturer would prefer a decen-
tralized supply chain under transshipment over a coordinated supply chain. Likewise,
there exists , above which a retailer would prefer a decentralized supply chain under
transshipment over a coordinated supply chain. In addition, supply chain coordination
and a win-win situation are attained when  2 [; ].
Proof. This is to show that when  is below , dM < 
t
M , and when  is above
, dRi < 
t
Ri
, where tM , and 
t
Ri
respectively denote manufacturer's and retailer's
prot in a supply chain under transshipment but no advance-purchase contract. In
addition, when  is between  and , dM  tM and dRi  tRi , where the equality
is achieved when  =  or  = , respectively. From Eqs. (5.11) and (5.12), it is
easy to verify that dM is linearly increasing in , and 
d
Ri
is linearly decreasing in
 for  2 [1;=(   c)]. So, there exists , below which dM < tM , which means
the manufacturer prefers a transshipment agreement to the coordinating contract.
Likewise, because dRi is linearly decreasing in , is continuous on  2 [1;=( c)],
dRi = 
c when  = 1, and dRi = 0 when  = =( c), there exists , above which
dRi < 
t
Ri
, which implies the retailers prefer a transshipment agreement to the coor-
dinating contract. In addition,  <  because at least one player always prefers the
coordinating contract. Moreover, when     , dM  tM and dRi  tRi becauseP
i2R 
d
Ri
+ dM >
P
i2R 
t
Ri
+ tM . Particularly,
 = argmax2[1;=( c)] dM(), and
dRi = 
t
Ri
.
The intuition of Proposition 5.2 is that because manufacturer's prot is linearly in-
creasing in  and retailer's prot is linearly decreasing in , the manufacturer can
select  that leaves the retailers not worse o and himself better o, compared to the
performances in the decentralized case.
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5.3 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we examine the impacts of the contract parameters and the market
parameters on the order quantities and the prots. Note that when analyzing the
impact of a parameter of interest, the other parameters are xed.
Proposition 5.3 Qi increases when w1 decreases, when w2 increases, when cij and
cji increase, or when  increases.
Proof. Proof can be derived directly from Nash equilibrium conditions given in Eq.
(5.6).
These results are intuitive. When w1 decreases, retailer i has more incentive to order
a larger quantity due to a larger prot margin. When cij or  is higher, the retailer
has to pay more to obtain products through transshipment. As a result, she would
avoid requesting transshipment by placing a larger rst order. In addition, when cij is
higher, facilitating transshipment becomes more protable; hence, the retailer places
a larger order. When w2 is higher, the retailer has to pay more to obtain products in
her second order.
Proposition 5.4  Qi is decreasing in c1.
 Qi is non-decreasing in c2 if c1+(c2@cij=@c2 (cij ij))@ETij=@Qi  (c2@cji=@c2 
cji+( 1)ij)@ETji=@Qi; decreasing in c2 if c1+(c2@cij=@c2 (cij ij))@ETij=@Qi
< (c2@cji=@c2   cji + (  1)ij)@ETji=@Qi.
 Qi is non-decreasing in ij if @ETij=@Qi(@cij=@ij 1)  @ETji=@Qi(@cji=@ij+
(  1)); decreasing in ij if @ETij=@Qi(@cij=@ij   1) < @ETji=@Qi(@cji=@ij +
(  1)).
 Qi is independent of ri.
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Proof. It can be shown that at equilibrium,
@ETij
@Qi
 0, and @ETji
@Qi
 0.
Then,
@F (Qi)
@c1
=  =w2 < 0.
@F (Qi)
@c2
= c1=c
2
2+

c2
@cij
@c2
  (cij   ij)

(c2)
2 
@ETij
@Qi
 

c2
@cji
@c2
  (cji   (  1) ij)

(c2)
2 
@ETji
@Qi
.
Hence,
@F (Qi)
@c2
 0 if c1+

c2
@cij
@c2
  (cij   ij)

@ETij
@Qi


c2
@cji
@c2
  (cji   (  1) ij)

@ETji
@Qi
,
and
@F (Qi)
@c2
< 0 otherwise.
@F (Qi)
@ij
=
1
c2
@ETij
@Qi

@cij
@ij
  1

  1
c2
@ETji
@Qi

@cji
@ij
+ (  1)

,
where
@cij
@ij
= [(  1)j(i   i)  ij]=(ij   ij), and @cji
@ij
= ij=(ij   ij).
Therefore,
@F (Qi)
@ij
 0 if @ETij
@Qi

@cij
@ij
  1

 @ETji
@Qi

@cji
@ij
+ (  1)

, and
@F (Qi)
@ij
< 0 oth-
erwise.
F (Qi) is independent of ri.
Intuitively, when c1 increases, the manufacturer will increase w1 to oset, and
therefore a retailer orders less in the rst order. For the eect of c2, this result
initially appears counter-intuitive if we forget cij and cji depend on c2. When c2 is
suciently high and increases, a retailer places a larger rst order to avoid paying high
w2, which is a function of c2. Alternatively, when c2 is relatively low and increases,
a retailer may lower her rst order quantity due to two eects: (1) a retailer is less
sensitive to an increase of c2 because she can still rely on transshipment to satisfy
her demand, and (2) a retailer experiences providing transshipment becoming less
protable and requesting transshipment becoming less expensive
It seems counter-intuitive to see a retailer orders more when ij increases for the
same reason. Specically, if cij and cji are signicantly increasing in ij, then a
retailer raises her order quantity because transshipment is more protable. On the
other hand, if transshipment prices cij and cji are not increasing in transshipment
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cost ij, transshipment becomes less attractive; hence, a retailer reduces her order
size. Finally, the retailer's optimal order quantity is independent of ri.
Proposition 5.5  c is increasing in ri, decreasing in c1, non-increasing in c2,
and non-increasing in ij.
 dM is independent of ri, increasing in c1, non-decreasing in c2, and non-decreasing
in ij.
 dRi is increasing in ri, decreasing in c1, non-increasing in c2, non-decreasing in
ij if Ef(@cij=@ij   1)Tijg  Ef(@cji=@ij + (  1))Tjig, and decreasing in ij
if Ef(@cij=@ij   1)Tijg < Ef(@cji=@ij + (  1))Tjig.
Proof. For c, consider Eq. (5.1) and substitute in Zi = Di   (min fDi; Qig + Tji).
@c=@ri = EfDig > 0, @c=@c1 =  
P
iQi < 0, @
c=@c2 = Ef
P
i=1;2min fDi; Qig +P
i;j=1;2;i6=j Tij  
P
i=1;2Dig  0, and @c=@ij =  EfTijg  0.
For dM , consider Eq. (5.4) and substitute in Zi. 
d
M is independent of ri, @
d
M=@c1 =
(  1)Pi=1;2Qi > 0, @dM=@c2 = Ef (  1)Pi;j=1;2;i 6=j Tij   (  1)min fDi; Qig+
(  1)Pi=1;2Dig  0, and @dM=@ij = Ef(  1)Pi;j=1;2;i 6=j Tijg  0.
For dRi , consider Eq. (5.5) and substitute in Zi. @
d
Ri
=@ri = EfDig > 0, @dRi=@c1 =
 Qi < 0. In addition, @dRi=@c2 = Efmin fDi; Qig+( @cji=@c2)Tji+@cij=@c2Tij 
Dig. Lastly, @dRi=@ij = Ef (@cji=@ij + (   1))Tji + (@cij=@ij   1)Tijg. Hence,
dRi is non-decreasing in ij if Ef(@cij=@ij  1)Tijg  Ef(@cji=@ij +(  1))Tjig, and
is decreasing in ij otherwise.
It is straightforward to see c increases (decreases) when the prot margin in-
creases (decreases). dM increases in w1, w2, and  because the manufacturer will
collect more revenue. dRi decreases in w1 and w2 because the retailer incurs higher
cost. The impact of the transshipment cost on the retailer's expected prot depends
on ij on cij and cji. Specically, if cij suciently increases when ij increases, then
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retailer i is able to collect more prot from providing transshipment. On the other
hand, if cij decreases when ij increases, transshipment becomes less protable, and
retailer's prot is therefore decreases.
The impacts of the market parameters on retailers' order quantity and the prots
are summarized in Table 5.2, where  , ", #, represent constant, non-decreasing,
non-increasing, respectively. In addition, l represents either non-increasing or non-
decreasing.
Table 5.2: Summary of Impacts of Market Parameters
Qi 
c dM 
d
Ri
ri - " - "
c1 # # " #
c2 l # " #
ij l # " l
5.4 Numerical Analysis
In this section, we numerically compare the performance of the coordinating contract
to that in the newsvendor and the transshipment-only scenarios. Let's assume re-
tailers' demand is uniformly distributed between 0 to 200, and consider the following
example to demonstrate numerical results.
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Table 5.3: Parameters for the Numerical Example
Coordination Newsvendor Transshipment-Only
Exogenous parameters: ri, rj 50 50 50
c1 10 - -
c2 23 - -
ij, ji 2 - 2
c - 10 10
Decision variables:  1.95 - -
w1 19.5 - -
w2 44.85 - -
 1.9 - -
cij, cji 19.78 - -
wb - 20 -
wd - - 20
cdij, c
d
ji - - 45
In Table 5.3, we use the same values of market parameters for the centralized
case as under coordination. Note that \-" means the parameter or variable is not
applicable. Also, the contract parameters under coordination satisfy the coordinating
conditions given in Eqs (5.8), (5.9), (5.10) and (5.17).
The impact of the transshipment prices on the retailers' optimal order quantity is
shown in Figure 5.3.
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Figure 5.3: Transshipment Prices and Optimal Order Quantity
Figure 5.3 shows that retailers' optimal order quantity is increasing in transship-
ment prices. In this example, the coordinating transshipment prices cij and c

ji are
19.78, which yields the retailers' optimal order quantity of 107.15, equal to the optimal
order quantity in the centralized case.
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Figure 5.4: Prot Comparison
Figure 5.4 compares the total supply chain prots under four scenarios, i.e., cen-
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tralization, coordination, transshipment-only and newsvendor, and reveals the fol-
lowing insights. Firstly, the total prot curves under coordination and under cen-
tralization overlap, and hence the optimal order quantities under both scenarios are
identical. Secondly, the supply chain prot under coordination is at least as high
as those under transshipment-only and newsvendor. This shows that the second or-
dering opportunity helps improve the total supply chain prot. Lastly, the optimal
order quantity under coordination is lower than that under transshipment-only and
newsvendor. The intuition is that the second ordering opportunity serves as an ample
resource to fully satisfy the demand even when the demand is high; thus lowering the
rst order quantity.
Next, Figure 5.5 presents the supply chain prot, the manufacturer's prot and
the retailer's prot under coordination. Because the two retailers are symmetric, we
deliberately include only retailer i's prot.
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Figure 5.5: Prots under Coordination
Figure 5.5 suggests two insights. First, the coordinating contract achieves supply
chain coordination, i.e., the optimal order quantity of the retailer is identical to the
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optimal order quantity of the supply chain. Second, the manufacturer's prot is
convex in the retailer's order quantity. It is interesting to see the manufacturer's
prot is literally equal to the total supply chain cost, and the retailers' total prot
is equal to the supply chain prot minus the total supply chain cost. Hence, the
manufacturer's prot is minimum when the total cost is minimum, which occurs
when the retailers' prots are maximum. In this supply chain, there are two cost
components, i.e., production cost and transshipment cost. When the retailers' order
quantities are lower than the optimal order quantity, the supply chain incurs high
production cost due to the larger amount of the retailers' second order. When the
retailers' order quantities are higher than the optimal order quantity, the supply
chain incurs high transshipment cost due to more transshipment executed. Therefore,
the manufacturer's prot function is convex. In reality, once the manufacturer and
retailers agree on , the manufacturer does not have an incentive to deviate from the
contract terms, which are determined by . In addition, even if the manufacturer
wants to deviate from the coordinating contract to improve his prot, there always
exists another  that provides the manufacturer the desired prot and the retailers
higher prot than that of the uncoordinating contract.
Figures 5.6 and 5.7 respectively show the retailer's and manufacturer's prots
under coordination, transshipment-only and newsvendor.
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Figure 5.7: Manufacturer's Prot Comparison
In Figure 5.6, the retailer decides the optimal order quantity in each scenario,
which accordingly determines the corresponding manufacturer's prot, highlighted in
Figure 5.7. It can be observed in Figures 5.7 and 5.6 that the manufacturer's and re-
tailer's prots under coordination are highest compared to those under transshipment-
only and newsvendor, which results in the Pareto improvement.
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Next, we show the eects of  on the manufacturer's and retailers' prots under
coordination in Figure 5.8. Then, Figure 5.9 displays the resulting prots and the
win-win situation after both the manufacturer and the retailers observe the contract
terms.
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Figure 5.8: Arbitrarily Prot Split
In Figure 5.8, the manufacturer's and the retailer's prots under centralization and
under transshipment-only are constant because they are independent of . Whereas,
the manufacturer's and retailers' prots under coordination are linearly increasing
and decreasing in , respectively. We can observe that there exists , below which
the manufacturer prot under coordination is below that under transshipment-only.
Similarly, there exists , above which the retailer's prot under coordination is below
that under transshipment-only.
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Figure 5.9: Resulting Prots
Figure 5.9 can be directly obtained from Figure 5.8. In Figure 5.9, when   , the
manufacturer prefers the transshipment agreement to the coordinating contract; when
  , the retailer prefers the transshipment agreement to the coordinating contract;
when     , both the manufacturer and the retailer prefer the coordinating
contract to the transshipment agreement; thus, both accept the coordinating contract
and receive their coordinated prot.
5.5 Summary
This chapter presents the analysis of an advance-purchase contract in a manufacturer-
retailers supply chain that allows transshipment between the two retailers. In practice,
transshipment is utilized in many industries to reduce the supply-demand mismatch.
However, the manufacturer tries to maximize his prot by selling products to the
retailers, and the retailers tend to request a high transshipment price to maximize
their prot; thus, two double-marginalizations exist.
The proposed advance-purchase contract helps align retailers' and supply chain's
objectives; hence, eliminating the double marginalizations. The coordination mech-
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anism includes an advance-purchase contract in a supply chain that consists of a
manufacturer and two retailers with transshipment. The manufacturer decides the
wholesale prices, transshipment prices and transshipment premium. This contract
is developed in two steps, in which it rst aligns the joint objective of the retailer
group with the objective of the supply chain, and second aligns the objective of each
individual retailer with the joint objective of the retailer group. We show that this
contract achieves supply chain coordination with the arbitrary prot split, and also
ensures a Pareto improvement.
There are three possible directions for future research. First, although our coordi-
nating approach can coordinate a supply chain even when two retailers are asymmet-
ric, we have not shown an extensive analysis when retailers are asymmetric. Second, a
supply chain in reality could have more than two retailers. Therefore, a study of such
supply chain would be straightforward to pursue. Third, there could be a situation
where a manufacturer has limited production capacity when the manufacturer does
not allow a job preemption, or when expediting job is not cost-eective. Therefore,
he is unable to immediately start his second production to satisfy the second order(s)
of retailers in a timely manner. In which case, the manufacturer would only have a
single production opportunity, and have to make his production decision in advance
taking into consideration the possibility of the second order(s) of the retailers.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS
This research is motivated by practical examples in, for instance, the automotive in-
dustry, and the advantages of the advance-purchase contract over the existing mech-
anisms previously developed in the literature. Existing literature uses a buy-back
contract and/or lost-sale penalty to coordinate a supply chain with sales eort. How-
ever, there are practical drawbacks associated with them. For a buy-back, there are
undesirable processes to complete from manufacturer's and retailer's perspectives that
would incur extra cost and require additional time and eort to administer. Likewise,
it is dicult to accurately track lost sales. Typically, a company addresses this issue
by investing in a pricey monitoring system, such as VMI, EDI or PoS, yet are still
unable to capture an exact amount of lost sales. In contrast, the advance-purchase
contract does not require such processes or system; thus, minimizing an amount of
eort, time and investment while improving supply chain's performance.
In this dissertation, we study impacts of the advance-purchase contract and supply
chain coordination in two dierent supply chains. We rst consider the supply chain
with the manufacturer and the retailer, who can exert sales eort to stipulate customer
demand. We then consider the supply chain with the manufacturer and the two
retailers, who after observing and fullling their own demand can transship products
between them to satisfy their unmet demand as a result of an inventory shortage.
We apply the advance-purchase contract to both studies to allow the retailers to have
two ordering opportunities. The rst (advance) order receives a discount, and the
second (regular) order is used as an \emergency" action to satisfy unmet demand
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in the nal stage. We use Game Theory to formulate the models and analyze the
games. For both supply chains, we develop the contracts, which are specied by the
manufacturer, to coordinate the retailers' decisions and allow arbitrary prot split.
To the best of our knowledge, this dissertation is the rst study that utilizes the
advance-purchase contract, and successfully coordinates these two supply chains.
Our coordination approaches work as follow. In the rst study, it allows the man-
ufacturer to ensure the retailers optimal decisions by properly specifying the unit
rebate and the second wholesale price, and to assure a Pareto improvement by ad-
justing the rst wholesale price and the rebate target level. In the second study, our
coordination approach is developed in two steps. It rst aligns the objective of the
retailer group with the objective of the supply chain, and second aligns the objec-
tive of each individual retailer with the objective of the retailer group. In addition,
the manufacturer species the contract terms, transshipment premium and arbitrary
prot split to assure a Pareto improvement.
We analytically and numerically show that supply chain coordination with arbi-
trary prot split is achievable, and the coordinating contracts lead to Pareto improv-
ing situations in both studies. In addition, adding the second ordering opportunity
increases the supply chains' prots, and at the same time lowers the optimal order
quantity of the supply chains. The reason is the second order allows the retailers to
meet all demand at the end of the selling season, while reducing the prot margin of
the rst order.
In this dissertation, we assume the manufacturer has innite capacity and can
satisfy retailers' order in a timely manner. A possible extension is to consider nite
capacity for the manufacturer or a long production lead-time. In which case, the
manufacturer must also decide production quantity, which later becomes a constraint
in satisfying the second retailers' order. For the rst study, possible future research
includes the development of a contract which assures fully-exible arbitrary prot
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split or allows the players to share the cost of sales eort. The study with dierent
forms of the demand-eort model is also worthwhile to pursue. For the second study,
the development of a coordinating mechanism, which includes transshipment in a
supply chain with a manufacturer and n (n > 2) retailers, is an interesting research
direction.
74
REFERENCES
[1] G. Oeser, Risk-Pooling Essentials. Springer International Publishing, 2015.
[2] L. W. Robinson, \Optimal and approximate policies in multiperiod, multilo-
cation inventory models with transshipments," OPERATIONS RESEARCH,
vol. 38, no. 2, pp. 278{295, 1990.
[3] N. Rudi, S. Kapur, and D. F. Pyke, \A two-location inventory model with
transshipment and local decision making,"Management Science, vol. 47, no. 12,
pp. 1668{1680, 2001.
[4] H. Krishnan, R. Kapuscinski, and D. A. Butz, \Coordinating contracts for
decentralized supply chains with retailer promotional eort," Management Sci-
ence, vol. 50, pp. 48{63, 01 2004.
[5] T. A. Taylor and W. Xiao, \Incentives for Retailer Forecasting: Rebates vs.
Returns," MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, vol. 55, no. 10, pp. 1654{1669, 2009.
[6] H. Shin and T. I. Tunca, \Do rms invest in forecasting eciently? the eect of
competition on demand forecast investments and supply chain coordination,"
Operations Research, vol. 58, no. 6, pp. 1592{1610, 2010.
[7] M. Ferguson, J. V Daniel, R. G., and G. C. Souza, \Supply chain coordination
for false failure returns," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management,
vol. 8, pp. 376{393, Fall 2006.
75
[8] G. Cachon and M. A. Lariviere, \Supply chain coordination with revenue-
sharing contracts: Strengths and limitations," Management Science, vol. 51,
pp. 30{44, 01 2005.
[9] B. A. Pasternack, \Optimal pricing and return policies for perishable commodi-
ties," Marketing Science (pre-1986), vol. 4, p. 166, Spring 1985.
[10] T. A. Taylor, \Channel coordination under price protection, midlife returns; and
end-of-life returns in dynamic markets,"Management Science, vol. 47, pp. 1220{
1234, 09 2001.
[11] T. A. Taylor, \Supply chain coordination under channel rebates with sales eort
eects," Management Science, vol. 48, pp. 992{1107, 08 2002.
[12] D. Xing and T. Liu, \Sales eort free riding and coordination with price match
and channel rebate," European Journal of Operational Research, vol. 219, no. 2,
pp. 264 { 271, 2012.
[13] G. P. Cachon, \The Allocation of Inventory Risk in a Supply Chain: Push,
Pull, and Advance-Purchase Discount Contracts,"MANAGEMENT SCIENCE,
vol. 50, no. 2, pp. 222{238, 2004.
[14] E. R. Berndt and J. A. Hurvitz, \Vaccine Advance-Purchase Agreements For
Low-Income Countries: Practical Issues," Health A, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 653{665,
2005.
[15] Y. He, X. Zhao, L. Zhao, and J. He, \Coordinating a supply chain with ef-
fort and price dependent stochastic demand," Applied Mathematical Modelling,
vol. 33, no. 6, pp. 2777 { 2790, 2009.
[16] D. Simchi-Levi, X. Chen, and J. Bramel, The Logic of Logistics. Springer Series
in Operations Research and Financial Engineering, 2014.
76
[17] D. J. Thomas and P. M. Grin, \Coordinated supply chain management,"
European Journal of Operational Research, vol. 94, no. 1, pp. 1 { 15, 1996.
[18] G. P. Cachon and C. Terwiesch, Matching Supply with Demand: An Introduc-
tion to Operations Management. McGraw Hill/Irwin, second ed., 2008.
[19] G. P. Cachon and P. H. Zipkin, \Competitive and Cooperative Inventory Poli-
cies in a Two-Stage Supply Chain," MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, vol. 45, no. 7,
pp. 936{953, 1999.
[20] G. P. Cachon, \Supply chain coordination with contracts," in Supply Chain
Management: Design, Coordination and Operation (S. Graves and A. de Kok,
eds.), vol. 11 of Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science,
pp. 227 { 339, Elsevier, 2003.
[21] Y. Zhang, K. Donohue, and T. H. Cui, \Contract preferences and performance
for the loss-averse supplier: Buyback vs. revenue sharing," Management Sci-
ence, vol. 62, no. 6, pp. 1734{1754, 2016.
[22] B. A. Pasternack, Using Revenue Sharing to Achieve Channel Coordination for
a Newsboy Type Inventory Model, pp. 117{136. Boston, MA: Springer US, 2005.
[23] W. Yunzeng, J. Li, and S. Zuo-Jun, \Channel performance under consignment
contract with revenue sharing.," Management Science, vol. 50, no. 1, pp. 34 {
47, 2004.
[24] X. Hu, R. Caldentey, and G. Vulcano, \Revenue sharing in airline alliances,"
Management Science, vol. 59, no. 5, pp. 1177{1195, 2013.
[25] H. L. Lee, V. Padmanabhan, T. A. Taylor, and S. Whang, \Price protection in
the personal computer industry.," Management Science, vol. 46, no. 4, p. 467,
2000.
77
[26] L. Dong and K. Zhu, \Two-wholesale-price contracts: Push, pull, and advanced-
purchase discount contracts," Manufacturing & Service Operations Manage-
ment, no. 3, pp. 291{311, 2007.
[27] O. Ozer and W. Wei, \Strategic Commitments for an Optimal Capacity De-
cision Under Asymmetric Forecast Information," MANAGEMENT SCIENCE,
vol. 52, no. 8, pp. 1238{1257, 2006.
[28] S.-H. Cho and C. S. Tang, \Advance selling in a supply chain under uncer-
tain supply and demand," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management,
vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 305{319, 2013.
[29] Y. Rong, Studying the impact of supply uncertainty on multi-echelon supply
chain. PhD thesis, Lehigh University, 2008.
[30] R. Gullu, G.-J. van Houtum, F. Z. Sargut, and N. Erkip, \Analysis of a De-
centralized Supply Chain Under Partial Cooperation," MANUFACTURING
SERVICE OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 229{247, 2005.
[31] P. M. Reyes, \A game theory approach for solving the transshipment problem: a
supply chain management strategy teaching tool," Supply Chain Management,
vol. 11, no. 4, pp. 288{293, 2006.
[32] S. Axsater, \A New Decision Rule for Lateral Transshipments in Inventory
Systems," MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, vol. 49, no. 9, pp. 1168{1179, 2003.
[33] J. Yang and Z. Qin, \Capacitated Production Control with Virtual Lateral
Transshipments," OPERATIONS RESEARCH, vol. 55, no. 6, pp. 1104{1119,
2007.
78
[34] H. Zhao, V. Deshpande, and J. K. Ryan, \Inventory Sharing and Rationing in
Decentralized Dealer Networks," MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, vol. 51, no. 4,
pp. 531{547, 2005.
[35] X. Hu, I. Duenyas, and R. Kapuscinski, \Existence of Coordinating Transship-
ment Prices in a Two-Location Inventory Model," MANAGEMENT SCIENCE,
vol. 53, no. 8, pp. 1289{1302, 2007.
[36] U. Ozen, J. Fransoo, H. Norde, and M. Slikker, \Cooperation Between Multi-
ple Newsvendors with Warehouses," MANUFACTURING SERVICE OPERA-
TIONS MANAGEMENT, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 311{324, 2008.
[37] R. Anupindi, Y. Bassok, and E. Zemel, \A General Framework for the Study of
Decentralized Distribution Systems," MANUFACTURING SERVICE OPER-
ATIONS MANAGEMENT, vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 349{368, 2001.
[38] G. Sosic, \Transshipment of Inventories Among Retailers: Myopic vs. Far-
sighted Stability," MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, vol. 52, no. 10, pp. 1493{1508,
2006.
[39] Y. T. Herer, M. Tzur, and E. Yucesan, \Transshipments: An emerging in-
ventory recourse to achieve supply chain leagility," International Journal of
Production Economics, vol. 80, no. 3, pp. 201 { 212, 2002.
[40] X. Hu, I. Duenyas, and R. Kapuscinski, \Optimal Joint Inventory and Trans-
shipment Control Under Uncertain Capacity," OPERATIONS RESEARCH,
vol. 56, no. 4, pp. 881{897, 2008.
[41] X. Chen, G. Hao, X. Li, and K. F. C. Yiu, \The impact of demand variabil-
ity and transshipment on vendor's distribution policies under vendor managed
inventory strategy," International Journal of Production Economics, vol. 139,
no. 1, pp. 42 { 48, 2012. Supply Chain Risk Management.
79
[42] C. R. Rosales, U. S. Rao, and D. F. Rogers, \Retailer transshipment versus
central depot allocation for supply network design," Decision Sciences, vol. 44,
no. 2, pp. 329{356, 2013.
[43] J. Hu, E. Watson, and H. Schneider, \Approximate solutions for multi-location
inventory systems with transshipments," International Journal of Production
Economics, vol. 97, no. 1, pp. 31 { 43, 2005.
[44] A. van Wijk, I. Adan, and G. van Houtum, \Approximate evaluation of multi-
location inventory models with lateral transshipments and hold back levels,"
European Journal of Operational Research, vol. 218, no. 3, pp. 624 { 635, 2012.
[45] D. Ozdemir, E. Yucesan, and Y. T. Herer, \Multi-location transshipment prob-
lem with capacitated transportation," European Journal of Operational Re-
search, vol. 175, no. 1, pp. 602 { 621, 2006.
[46] C. Paterson, R. Teunter, and K. Glazebrook, \Enhanced lateral transshipments
in a multi-location inventory system," European Journal of Operational Re-
search, vol. 221, no. 2, pp. 317 { 327, 2012.
[47] G. Yang, R. Dekker, A. F. Gabor, and S. Axsater, \Service parts inventory
control with lateral transshipment and pipeline stockexibility," International
Journal of Production Economics, vol. 142, no. 2, pp. 278{289, 2013.
[48] D. Ozdemir, E. Yucesan, and Y. T. Herer, \Multi-location transshipment prob-
lem with capacitated production," European Journal of Operational Research,
vol. 226, no. 3, pp. 425 { 435, 2013.
[49] Y. Y. Gong and E. Yucesan, \Stochastic optimization for transshipment prob-
lems with positive replenishment lead times," International Journal of Produc-
tion Economics, vol. 135, no. 1, pp. 61 { 72, 2012. Advances in Optimization
and Design of Supply Chains.
80
[50] X. Huang and G. Sosic, \Transshipment of inventories: Dual allocations
vs. transshipment prices," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management,
vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 299{318, 2010.
[51] K. E. Wee and M. Dada, \Optimal Policies for Transshipping Inventory in a
Retail Network," MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, vol. 51, no. 10, pp. 1519{1533,
2005.
[52] X. Huang and G. Sosic, \Repeated newsvendor game with transshipments under
dual allocations," European Journal of Operational Research, vol. 204, no. 2,
pp. 274 { 284, 2010.
[53] D. Granot and G. Sosic, \A three-stage model for a decentralized distribution
system of retailers," Oper. Res., vol. 51, pp. 771{784, Sept. 2003.
[54] G. V. der Heide and K. Roodbergen, \Transshipment and rebalancing policies
for library books," European Journal of Operational Research, vol. 228, no. 2,
pp. 447 { 456, 2013.
[55] N. Comez, K. E. Stecke, and M. Cakanyldrm, \In-season transshipments
among competitive retailers," Manufacturing & Service Operations Manage-
ment, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 290{300, 2012.
[56] B. Satr, S. Savasaneril, and Y. Serin, \Pooling through lateral transshipments
in service parts systems," European Journal of Operational Research, vol. 220,
no. 2, pp. 370 { 377, 2012.
[57] B. Hezarkhani and W. Kubiak, \A coordinating contract for transshipment
in a two-company supply chain," European Journal of Operational Research,
vol. 207, no. 1, pp. 232 { 237, 2010.
81
[58] Y. Dong, K. Xu, and P. T. Evers, \Transshipment incentive contracts in a
multi-level supply chain," European Journal of Operational Research, vol. 223,
no. 2, pp. 430 { 440, 2012.
[59] R. Li, J. K. Ryan, and Z. Zeng, \Coordination in a single-supplier, multi-
retailer distribution system: Supplier-facilitated transshipments." Available at:
http://lallyschool.rpi.edu/events/details/Ryan.paper.pdf, 2012.
[60] M. A. Lariviere and V. Padmanabhan, \Slotting allowances and new product
introductions," Marketing Science (1986-1998), vol. 16, p. 112, Spring 1997.
[61] P. Ma, H. Wang, and J. Shang, \Supply chain channel strategies with quality
and marketing eort-dependent demand," International Journal of Production
Economics, vol. 144, no. 2, pp. 572 { 581, 2013.
[62] W. Chu and P. S. Desai, \Channel coordination mechanisms for customer sat-
isfaction," Marketing Science, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 343{359, 1995.
[63] S. K. Mukhopadhyay, X. Zhu, and X. Yue, \Optimal contract design for mixed
channels under information asymmetry," Production and Operations Manage-
ment, vol. 17, pp. 641{650, Nov 2008.
[64] H. S. Heese and J. M. Swaminathan, \Inventory and sales eort manage-
ment under unobservable lost sales," European Journal of Operational Research,
vol. 207, no. 3, pp. 1263 { 1268, 2010.
[65] P. Ma, H. Wang, and J. Shang, \Contract design for two-stage supply chain
coordination: Integrating manufacturer-quality and retailer-marketing eorts,"
International Journal of Production Economics, vol. 146, no. 2, pp. 745 { 755,
2013.
82
[66] Q. Li and Z. Liu, \Supply chain coordination via a two-part tari contract with
price and sales eort dependent demand," Decision Science Letters, vol. 4, no. 1,
pp. 27{34, 2015.
[67] R. Desiraju, \New product introductions, slotting allowances, and retailer dis-
cretion," Journal of Retailing, vol. 77, no. 3, pp. 335 { 358, 2001.
[68] L. Dong and N. Rudi, \Who benets from transshipment? exogenous vs.
endogenous wholesale prices," MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, vol. 50, no. 5,
pp. 645{657, 2004.
[69] X. Zhao and D. Atkins, \Transshipment between competing retailers," IIE
Transactions, vol. 41, no. 8, pp. 665{676, 2009.
[70] J. Shao, H. Krishnan, and S. T. McCormick, \Incentives for transshipment in a
supply chain with decentralized retailers," Manufacturing & Service Operations
Management, vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 361{372, 2011.
[71] J. Zhang, \Transshipment and Its Impact on Supply Chain Members' Perfor-
mance," MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, vol. 51, no. 10, pp. 1534{1539, 2005.
[72] G. Jehle and P. Reny, Advanced Microeconomic Theory. 2nd ed., 2000.
[73] A. Alptekinoglu, A. Banerjee, A. Paul, and N. Jain, \Inventory pooling to de-
liver dierentiated service," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management,
vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 33{44, 2013.
[74] P. Egri and J. Vancza, \A distributed coordination mechanism for supply
networks with asymmetric information," European Journal of Operational Re-
search, vol. 226, no. 3, pp. 452 { 460, 2013.
[75] Y. T. Herer, M. Tzur, and E. Yucesan, \The multilocation transshipment prob-
lem," IIE Transactions, vol. 38, no. 3, pp. 185{200, 2006.
83
[76] J. Li, S. Wang, and T. Cheng, \Competition and cooperation in a single-retailer
two-supplier supply chain with supply disruption," International Journal of
Production Economics, vol. 124, no. 1, pp. 137 { 150, 2010.
[77] X. Zhao and D. R. Atkins, \Newsvendors under simultaneous price and inven-
tory competition," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, vol. 10,
no. 3, pp. 539{546, 2008.
[78] H. S. Ahn and P. Kaminsky, \Production and distribution policy in a two-stage
stochastic push-pull supply chain.," IIE Transactions, vol. 37, no. 7, pp. 609 {
621, 2005.
[79] M. M. Aliabadi, \Supply chain optimization by reducing and preventing inated
orders," Service Operations and Logistics, and Informatics, pp. 1{5, 2007.
[80] P. P. Belobaba, \Airline yield management. an overview of seat inventory con-
trol," Transportation Science, vol. 21, no. 2, p. 63, 1987.
[81] G. P. Cachon and M. Fisher, \Supply Chain Inventory Management and the
Value of Shared Information," MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, vol. 46, no. 8,
pp. 1032{1048, 2000.
[82] X. Chen and G. Hao, \Optimal order policies for supply chain with options
contracts," in Services Systems and Services Management, 2005. Proceedings
of ICSSSM '05. 2005 International Conference on, vol. 1, pp. 680{683 Vol. 1,
June 2005.
[83] A. S. Manikas, Essays in inventory decisions under uncertainty. PhD thesis,
Georgia Institute of Technology, 2008.
[84] N. Sabbaghi, Coordination and competition in resource-constrained channels.
PhD thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2008.
84
[85] D. Simchi-Levi, P. Kaminsky, and E. Simchi-Levi, Designing & Managing the
Supply Chain. McGraw-Hill, 2003.
[86] L. B. Toktay, L. M. Wein, and S. A. Zenios, \Inventory Management of Reman-
ufacturable Products," MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, vol. 46, no. 11, pp. 1412{
1426, 2000.
[87] L. Dong, P. Kouvelis, and Z. Tian, \Dynamic pricing and inventory control
of substitute products," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management,
vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 317{339, 2009.
[88] E. L. Plambeck and T. A. Taylor, \Implications of breach remedy and renegotia-
tion for design of supply contracts," Research Papers 1888, Stanford University,
Graduate School of Business, Oct. 2004.
[89] E. L. Plambeck and T. A. Taylor, \Implications of renegotiation for optimal
contract exibility and investment," Research Papers 1889, Stanford University,
Graduate School of Business, Oct. 2004.
[90] G. P. Cachon and R. Swinney, \Purchasing, Pricing, and Quick Response in the
Presence of Strategic Consumers," MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, vol. 55, no. 3,
pp. 497{511, 2009.
[91] H. Zhao, V. Deshpande, and J. K. Ryan, \Emergency transshipment in decen-
tralized dealer networks: When to send and accept transshipment requests,"
Naval Research Logistics, vol. 53, no. 6, pp. 547{567, 2006.
[92] J. Grahovac and A. Chakravarty, \Sharing and Lateral Transshipment of Inven-
tory in a Supply Chain with Expensive Low-Demand Items," MANAGEMENT
SCIENCE, vol. 47, no. 4, pp. 579{594, 2001.
85
[93] J. Burton and A. Banerjee, \Cost-parametric analysis of lateral transshipment
policies in two-echelon supply chains," International Journal of Production Eco-
nomics, vol. 93-94, pp. 169 { 178, 2005. Proceedings of the Twelfth International
Symposium on Inventories.
[94] D. J. Wu and P. R. Kleindorfer, \Competitive Options, Supply Contracting, and
Electronic Markets," MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, vol. 51, no. 3, pp. 452{466,
2005.
[95] D. C. Quan, \The Price of a Reservation," Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Ad-
ministration Quarterly, vol. 43, no. 3, pp. 77{86, 2002.
[96] Y. Gerchak and Y. Wang, \Revenue-sharing vs. wholesale-price contracts in
assembly systems with random demand," PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS
MANAGEMENT, vol. 13, pp. 23{33, SPR 2004.
[97] S. A. Neslin, T. P. Novak, K. R. Baker, and D. L. Homan, \An Optimal Con-
tact Model for Maximizing Online Panel Response Rates," MANAGEMENT
SCIENCE, vol. 55, no. 5, pp. 727{737, 2009.
[98] X. Xu, \Optimal Price and Product Quality Decisions in a Distribution Chan-
nel," MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, vol. 55, no. 8, pp. 1347{1352, 2009.
[99] O. Foros, K. P. Hagen, and H. J. Kind, \Price-Dependent Prot Sharing as
a Channel Coordination Device," MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, vol. 55, no. 8,
pp. 1280{1291, 2009.
[100] G. P. Cachon and M. A. Lariviere, \Contracting to Assure Supply: How to Share
Demand Forecasts in a Supply Chain," MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, vol. 47,
no. 5, pp. 629{646, 2001.
86
[101] J. Li, S. Chand, M. Dada, and S. Mehta, \Managing Inventory Over a Short
Season: Models with Two Procurement Opportunities," MANUFACTURING
SERVICE OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 174{184, 2009.
[102] X. Su and F. Zhang, \Strategic Customer Behavior, Commitment, and Supply
Chain Performance," MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, vol. 54, no. 10, pp. 1759{
1773, 2008.
[103] D. Granot and S. Yin, \Price and Order Postponement in a Decentralized
Newsvendor Model with Multiplicative and Price-Dependent Demand," OP-
ERATIONS RESEARCH, vol. 56, no. 1, pp. 121{139, 2008.
[104] S. Netessine and F. Zhang, \Positive vs. Negative Externalities in Inventory
Management: Implications for Supply Chain Design," MANUFACTURING
SERVICE OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 58{73, 2005.
[105] F. Zhang, \Competition, Cooperation, and Information Sharing in a Two-
Echelon Assembly System," MANUFACTURING SERVICE OPERATIONS
MANAGEMENT, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 273{291, 2006.
[106] J. Chod and N. Rudi, \Strategic Investments, Trading, and Pricing Under Fore-
cast Updating," MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, vol. 52, no. 12, pp. 1913{1929,
2006.
[107] F. Bernstein and A. Federgruen, \Decentralized Supply Chains with Competing
Retailers Under Demand Uncertainty," MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, vol. 51,
no. 1, pp. 18{29, 2005.
[108] E. L. Plambeck and T. A. Taylor, \Sell the Plant? The Impact of Contract
Manufacturing on Innovation, Capacity, and Protability," MANAGEMENT
SCIENCE, vol. 51, no. 1, pp. 133{150, 2005.
87
[109] S. Ulku, L. B. Toktay, and E. Yucesan, \Risk Ownership in Contract Manu-
facturing," MANUFACTURING SERVICE OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT,
vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 225{241, 2007.
[110] S. Benjaafar, W. L. Cooper, and J.-S. Kim, \On the Benets of Pooling in
Production-Inventory Systems," MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, vol. 51, no. 4,
pp. 548{565, 2005.
[111] R. A. Shumsky and F. Zhang, \Dynamic Capacity Management with Substitu-
tion," OPERATIONS RESEARCH, vol. 57, no. 3, pp. 671{684, 2009.
[112] M. Nagarajan and S. Rajagopalan, \Inventory Models for Substitutable Prod-
ucts: Optimal Policies and Heuristics," MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, vol. 54,
no. 8, pp. 1453{1466, 2008.
[113] T. A. Taylor and E. L. Plambeck, \Simple Relational Contracts to Motivate
Capacity Investment: Price Only vs. Price and Quantity,"MANUFACTURING
SERVICE OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 94{113, 2007.
[114] J. A. Van Mieghem, \Coordinating Investment, Production, and Subcontract-
ing," MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, vol. 45, no. 7, pp. 954{971, 1999.
[115] T. A. Taylor, \Sale Timing in a Supply Chain: When to Sell to the Retailer,"
MANUFACTURING SERVICE OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT, vol. 8, no. 1,
pp. 23{42, 2006.
[116] O. Ozer, O. Uncu, and W. Wei, \Selling to the \Newsvendor" with a forecast
update: Analysis of a dual purchase contract," European Journal of Operational
Research, vol. 182, no. 3, pp. 1150 { 1176, 2007.
88
[117] M. E. Ferguson, G. A. DeCroix, and P. H. Zipkin, \Commitment decisions
with partial information updating," Naval Research Logistics, vol. 52, no. 8,
pp. 780{795, 2005.
[118] F. Erhun, P. Keskinocak, and S. Tayur, \Dynamic procurement in a capacitated
supply chain facing uncertain demand," IIE Transactions, vol. 40, pp. 733{748,
2008.
[119] M. A. Lariviere and E. L. Porteus, \Selling to the Newsvendor: An Analy-
sis of Price-Only Contracts," MANUFACTURING SERVICE OPERATIONS
MANAGEMENT, vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 293{305, 2001.
[120] G. P. Cachon and M. A. Lariviere, \Capacity Choice and Allocation: Strate-
gic Behavior and Supply Chain Performance," MANAGEMENT SCIENCE,
vol. 45, no. 8, pp. 1091{1108, 1999.
[121] S. M. Hong-Minh, S. M. Disney, and M. M. Naim, \The dynamics of emergency
transhipment supply chains," International Journal of Physical Distribution &
Logistics Management, vol. 30, no. 9, pp. 788{816, 2000.
[122] R. Anupindi and Y. Bassok, \Centralization of stocks: Retailers vs. manufac-
turer," Management Science, vol. 45, no. 2, pp. pp. 178{191, 1999.
[123] N. Suakkaphong and M. Dror, \Managing decentralized inventory and trans-
shipment," TOP, vol. 19, pp. 480{506, 2011.
[124] Y. Dai, X. Chao, S.-C. Fang, and H. Nuttle, \Game theoretic analysis of a dis-
tribution system with customer market search," Annals of Operations Research,
vol. 135, pp. 223{228, 2005.
89
[125] N. S. Summereld and M. Dror, \Stochastic programming for decentralized
newsvendor with transshipment," International Journal of Production Eco-
nomics, vol. 137, no. 2, pp. 292 { 303, 2012.
[126] B. Dan, J. Xiao, and X. mei Zhang, \The collaborative distribution strategies
in a dual-channel supply chain with electronic and retail channels," in Service
Systems and Service Management, 2008 International Conference on, pp. 1 {5,
30 2008-july 2 2008.
[127] G. G. Cai, Z. G. Zhang, and M. Zhang, \Game theoretical perspectives on dual-
channel supply chain competition with price discounts and pricing schemes,"
International Journal of Production Economics, vol. 117, no. 1, pp. 80 { 96,
2009.
[128] A. Kocabiyikoglu and I. Popescu, \An elasticity approach to the newsven-
dor with price-sensitive demand," OPERATIONS RESEARCH, vol. 59, no. 2,
pp. 301{312, 2011.
[129] L. Dong, P. Kouvelis, and P. Su, \Global facility network design with transship-
ment and responsive pricing," MANUFACTURING SERVICE OPERATIONS
MANAGEMENT, p. msom.1090.0269, 2009.
[130] L. W. Robinson and S. Gavirneni, \Using retailer order commitments to im-
prove supply chain performance." Working paper.
[131] M. Shunko, L. Debo, and S. Gavirneni, \Transfer pricing and oshoring in
global supply chains: Impact of contracts and exibility." Working paper.
[132] E. L. Porteus, Foundations of Stochastic Inventory Theory. 2002.
[133] D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991.
90
[134] S. Netessine and N. Rudi, \Supply chain choice on the internet," Management
Science, vol. 52, pp. 844{864, 06 2006.
[135] T. A. Taylor andW. Xiao, \Does a manufacturer benet from selling to a better-
forecasting retailer?," Management Science, vol. 56, no. 9, pp. 1584{1598, 2010.
[136] S. Deng and C. A. Yano, \Designing supply contracts considering prot targets
and risk," Production and Operations Management, vol. 25, no. 7, pp. 1292{
1307, 2016.
[137] L. Xiangwen, S. Jing-Sheng, and A. Regan, \Rebate, returns and price protec-
tion policies in channel coordination.," IIE Transactions, vol. 39, no. 2, pp. 111
{ 124, 2007.
[138] B. A. Pasternack, \Optimal pricing and return policies for perishable commodi-
ties," Marketing Science, vol. 27, pp. 131{132,143{144, Jan 2008.
[139] C.-H. Chiu, T.-M. Choi, and C. S. Tang, \Price, rebate, and returns supply
contracts for coordinating supply chains with price-dependent demands," Pro-
duction and Operations Management, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 81{91, 2011.
91
APPENDIX A
ADDITIONAL DERIVATIONS FOR CHAPTER 4
A.1 Centralized Supply Chain with Minimum Sales Eort
We derive an optimal order quantity of the supply chain. The expected prot of the
supply chain is
C =  c1Q+ E

rmin fQ;Dg+ (r   c2) (D  Q)+
	
: (A.1)
The optimal order quantity satises  1 ((c2   c1) =c2).
A.2 Decentralized Supply Chain under Advance-Purchase Contract
with Minimum Sales Eort
We derive an optimal ordering decision of an independent retailer who exerts mini-
mum sales eort. Under this supply chain setting, the retailer's expected prot is
AR =  w1Q+ E

rmin fQ;Dg+ (r   w2) (D  Q)+
	
; (A.2)
where the retailer pays w1Q for her rst order, and sells them at the retail price r,
and makes prot of r   w2 for each unit in her second order quantity. Similarly, the
retailer's expected prot can be expressed by using integrals as follows:
AR = (r   w1)Q  r
Z Q
0
(Q D) d (D) + (r   w2)
Z 1
Q
(D  Q) d (D) : (A.3)
Thus,
(@=@Q)AR = r   w1   r (Q)  (r   w2) [1   (Q)] ; (A.4)
= w2   w1   w2 (Q) : (A.5)
The optimal order quantity satises  1 ((w2   w1) =w2).
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A.3 Decentralized Supply Chain under Advance-Purchase and Target
Rebate Contract with Minimum Sales Eort
We rst consider an independent retailer, who exerts minimum sales eort. Under
this setting, retailer's expected prot is
BR (QjT ) =  w1Q+ E

rmin fQ;Dg+ u (min fQ;Dg   T )+ + (r   w2) (D  Q)+
	
:
(A.6)
Compared with Eq. (4.3), this is a special case when e = 1. In addition, the retailer
receives the rebate u from the manufacturer for every unit she sells from her inventory
above the target level T , as represented by the third term in Eq. (A.6). Alternatively,
the retailer's expected prot can be expressed based on the condition on her order
size and a target level as follows:
BR =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
(r   w1)Q  r
R Q
0
(Q D) d (D)
+ (r   w2)
R1
Q
(D  Q) d (D) ; if Q  T ;
(r   w1)Q  r
R Q
0
(Q D) d (D)
+u
R Q
T
(D   T ) d (D) + (Q  T ) [1   (Q)]

+(r   w2)
R1
Q
(D  Q) d (D) ; if Q > T .
(A.7)
Thus, the rst and second order derivatives with respect to Q are
(@=@Q) BR =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
r   w1   r (Q)  (r   w2) [1   (Q)] ; if Q  T ;
r   w1   r (Q) + u [1   (Q)]
  (r   w2) [1   (Q)] ; if Q > T ,
(A.8)
=
8>><>>:
w2   w1   w2 (Q) ; if Q  T ;
w2 + u  w1   (w2 + u)  (Q) ; if Q > T ,
(A.9)
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and
 
@2=@Q2

BR =
8>><>>:
 w2 (Q) ; if Q  T ;
  (w2 + u) (Q) ; if Q > T .
(A.10)
Dene qA   1 ((w2   w1) =w2), and qB   1 ((w2 + u  w1) =(w2 + u)). Also
dene f (T )  BR
 
qAjT  BR  qBjT on T 2 qA; qB, and dene 0 such that
f (0) = 0, i.e., the target level threshold under the minimum-eort scenario that
makes the retailer indierent between ordering the optimal quantity in the with-
rebate and without-rebate cases.
Lemma A.1 (a) 0 exists, is unique, and satises 0 2
 
qA; qB

. (b) The optimal
order quantity for the retailer under the advance-purchase and target rebate contract,
q, is given by the following: If T < 0, then q = qB; if T > 0, then q = qA; if
T = 0, then the retailer is indierent between ordering q
A and qB.
Proof. It is straightforward to show that if T  qA, then qB maximizes BR , and if
T  qB, then qA maximizes BR . If qA  T  qB, then BR
 
qAjT = w2   qA +
(r   w2)E fDg, and BR
 
qBjT = (w2 + u)    qB   u[  (T ) + T (1   (T ))] + (r  
w2)E fDg. Because f0
 
qA

< 0 < f0
 
qB

and f0 () is continuous and increas-
ing, there exists a single-valued inverse function f 10 and a unique 0; further, 0 2 
qA; qB

. If qA < T < qB, then limQ!T  (@=@Q)BR (QjT ) < 0 < limQ!T+ (@=@Q)
BR (QjT ). Because qA maximizes BR (QjT ) on [0; T ) and qB maximizes BR (QjT ) on
(T;1), Q0 = argmaxQ2fqA;qBg BR (QjT ). If T < 0, then f0 (T ) < 0 and BR
 
qBjT >
BR
 
qAjT. If T > 0, then f0 (T ) > 0.
A.4 Model Formulation for Supply Chain under Target Rebate-Only
Contract with Sales Eort
Under the target rebate-only contract, the retailer's expected prot is
TR =  wQ+ E

rmin fQ; eDg+ u (min fQ; eDg   T )+	  V (e) : (A.11)
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The retailer incurs procurement cost and sales eort cost as shown by the rst and last
terms in Eq. (A.11), and makes prot by fullling customer's demand and receiving
the rebate from the manufacturer as shown by the second and third terms in Eq.
(A.11). The expected manufacturer's prot is
BM = (w   c)Q  E

u (min fQ; eDg   T )+	 : (A.12)
The manufacturer makes prot by satisfying the retailer's order, and incurs the cost
of providing the rebate to the retailer as respectively given out in Eq. (A.12). For
the thorough analysis, we refer readers to Taylor [11] or Chiu et al. [139].
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